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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
1'111:- i:-; an adion by KPnnPeott <·rnployPf'H to 
·,,1 1 r da111ag1•:-; from dPfrndants for brPach of contract 
! 1·r ··:wl1 of t'id11<'iary dutiPs, arising out of writt<m 
·I 1•ral promisPs to pay strikP henPfits to plaintiffs 
'"1"' tht· 1%i-(iS strikl' at KPnnP<'Ott C'oppn Corpora-
1' - 1 ·tali propPrtiPs, whieh promises defendants rP-
.. I!,, 1'1ilfill. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvVER COUR'l1 
The case was tried to the court without a jury, and 
the court rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in 
the aggregate sum of $220,278, together with intt'rest 
thereon and costs. The ruling of the lower court was 
based upon its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
filed and entered herein. (R. 579-595) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants-appellants seek a reversal of the 
lower court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs. 
respondents respectfully seek to have this court affim1 
the lower court's decision in all respects and to grant 
respondents their costs on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the fall of 1966, defendants commenced an organi-
zational campaign among the l'mployees of Kennecott 
Copper Corporation ("Kennecott") designed to attract 
plaintiffs and other Kennecott employees into member-
ship in the defendant unions. (R. 396) 
As part of this organizational campaign, the de-
fendants through their various officers, including In-
ternational officers, general organizers and other author- 1 
ized representatives, repeatedly represented, promised. 
and guaranteed to plaintiffs, both orally and in writing, 
that they would receive strike benefits, varying from 
$90.00 to $150.00 per month per man, in the event the:· 
joined defendants and a strike occurred at Kennecott. ' 
(R. 396 and Exhibits P-1, page 195, and P-54) 
2 
During at least the final three months of this organi-
zational campaign, authorized representatives of defend-
ants represented to plaintiffs that they would be paid 
these strike benefits regardless of the outcome of the 
forthcoming representational election, held June 20, 21, 
1967. (R. 397) 
Plaintiffs, induced by and in reliance upon these and 
ntltPr reprt>sentations and guarantees, and particularly 
those regarding strike benefits, joined as members of 
defendants and thereafter performed all obligations and 
rluties required of members, including payment of dues, 
attmdance at meetings and service of picket duty. (R . 
.)97 and Exhibits 8, 11, 16, 18, 21 and 51) 
From July 15, 1967, to March 29, 1968, plaintiffs, 
among other Kennecott employees, engaged in a strike 
at the Kennecott properties in Utah, which strike was 
authorized and engaged in by defendants and other 
unions at Kennecott. (R. 397 and Exhibit P-138) 
Shortly after the commencement of this strike at 
Kt>nnecott, the plaintiffs were included, among all mem-
hern of Local 844, on a strike payroll submitted to de-
frndant Brotherhood for the payment of promised strike 
henefits; but plaintiffs were stricken from this strike 
pavroll by H. E. Gilbert, Brotherhood President, and 
\\We refused any promised strike benefits whatever from 
rMendants. (R. 763-764 and Exhibits P-78 and P-79) 
Defendants throughout the above-mentioned strike 
period paid full strike benefits to all members of Lodge 
3 
844 other than plaintiffs, which persons had joined that 
lodge prior to the 1966-67 organizational campaign. (R. 
917-939 and Exhibits P-79 to 84) 
At no time did defendants disqualify any member 
from receiving such strike benefits because of any out-
side earnings during the strike period; nor did defend-
ants make any inquiry concerning the outside earning, 
of those members receiving strike benefits during 
particular strike. (R. 158, 215, 879, 898, 929, and 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH 
JUDGMENT BELOW IS BASED ARE AMPLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
1. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the 
Plaintiff Oliver was a Member of the B.L.F. & E. 
The defendants contend that there is no evidence 
in the record to support the finding that the plaintiff 
Steven James Oliver was a member of the defendant 
unions at the time of the strike involved in this suit. 
Since he had been left off the initial B.L.:F'. & E. strih 
payroll, Exhibit P-78, Oliver was called as a witnt'ss !Ci 
clarify his membership position, and to avoid the Hry 
rontention now made by defendants. 
Oliver testified that, at the urging of Warren D. 
Cole, chairman of the defendant local, he signed 
necessary papers and joined the defendants in l\Iay, 
1967. (R. 1073) At that time he executed an application ' 
for membership in the B.L.F. & E. (Exhibit P-139) anrl 
4 
n statement releasing him from membership in his previ-
11118 muon, the Mine, Mill and Smelter \Yorkers. (R. 
J\l7J) Ulivt>r testified that he was at that time shown 
:i eop>· of the B.L.F. & E. Constitution and was told 
li,\ Cok that, as a member of the B.L.F. & E, he would 
n·cein strike benefits whether the forthcoming union 
d(·ction was won or lost by the B.L.F. & E. (R. 1074) 
()Jiyer further testified that, upon commencement of the 
h>nnerott strike, he performed picket duties for the 
B.L.F. & K (R. 1076) 
At no time prior to commencement of this action 
(li!l the B.L.F. & E. raise any question as to whether 
(JJi\·er was qualified as a member to receive B.L.F. & E. 
:-trike twnefits. The union accepted his services on the 
11iekd lim·, and when he inquired of Cole why he had 
not heen paid strike benefits, all Cole stated was "The 
(;rand Lodge has renigged on their contract, and you 
1rnn't get any." (R. 1076) 
Tlw defendants contend that the records in evidence 
no payment of dues by Oliver to the B.L.F. & E. 
: ln the contrary, the lower court granted leave to the 
dd"t>ndants to try to support this contention at the trial 
i'rnm dues payment records maintained by Kennecott, 
anrl the defendants failed to offer any such records. 
:n. 1072, 1079) 
rl'he record is clear that Oliver joined the B.L.F. & E. 
in the same manner as all of the other plaintiffs. The 
in which Oliver's situation differs frorn the 
011 1P1 plaintiffs is that he was erroneously excluded from 
5 
the initial strike payroll, Exhibit P-78. At least 
011
v 
other paintiff, B. L. Uliberri, was also erroneously PX 
c]uded from P-78, and the defendants nevertheless stipn. 
lated that he was a member in good standing of t]lf, 
- . 
B.L.F. & E. (R. 1060) 
2. The Evidence Supports the Finding That the 
Plaintiff Esquival is a Proper Party Plaintiff. 
Defendants assert that the plaintiff Herbierto Es-
quival is not entitled to recover damages in this action 
because he did not timely intervene as a plaintiff. It 
is true that Esquival was not included on plaintiffs' 
1 
list of intervenors filed May 24, 1968. (R. 232) Howenr, 
on that day plaintiffs sought by motion and were grantPd 
a one-week extension, to May 31, 1968, for the joinder 
1 
of further plaintiffs in the action. (R. 229) On May :n, : 
1968, interrogatory answers of Esqui val wer<' fih·d and 
served on the defendants. (R. 251-253) Plaintiffs' coun-
sel, through simple oversight, failed to include Esquival 
on a supplemental Notice of Joinder. However, at the 
time of filing of Esquival's answers, it was expressly 
stated therein that each plaintiff filing said 
including Esquival, should be added to Exhibit A to the i 
plaintiffs' original answers. (R. 242) That Exhibit A, 
in response to defendants' interrogatories, :"Pt forth 
those persons who had authorized this action and who 
intended to be plaintiffs in the action. Plaintiff EsqniYai 
was included in that category just the same as all otltrr 
plaintiffs, and defendants had knowledge of that fart 
Defendants made no objection to the extension 
sought by plaintiffs for further intervention, and they 
6 
111
ade 110 objection to the filing or content of Esquival's 
interrogatory answers. Esquival, like all of the plain-
tiffs hPrein, had been promised strike benefits by de-
frn<lants, was in all respects properly within the class 
of plaintiffs involved and fully answered the interroga-
tories propounded to him by defendants. (R. 251-253) 
Having been given practical notice of Esquival's joinder 
a plaintiff, and having made no objection thereto, 
defendants waived any objection they might have had 
to Esqnival's participation in the damage award in this 
aetion. 
3. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the 
Defendants Placed No Condition Other Than 
Membership on the Payment of Strike Benefits. 
ThP defendants state that the Constitution of the 
13.L.F. & E. itself ''prohibits the granting of strike bene-
fits to members not in the bargaining unit represented 
b: the union." (Def. Brief, p. 6) For that proposition, 
tlw Court is referred to pages 195-199 of the B.L.F. & E. 
Constitution, Exhibit P-1. There is absolutely no refer-
t·nce whatever in pages 195-199 of Exhibit P-1 to a 
"bargaining nnit represented by the union," let alone 
any provision which would limit the payment of strike 
lit"nefits to persons within such a unit. On the contrary, 
tlw provisions cited even provide for the payment of 
benefits to non-members, as well as members. (Art. 
10, Sec. 3(a) and (b), p. 195, Exhibit P-1) 
Then• is a clear record in this case that strike ben-
i'fits we-re in no way conditioned upon a person's job 
rlassification or bargaining unit. L. L. Iman, who was 
7 
in charge of the B.L.F. & E. organizational cainpai[)"n 
tl'stified that persons outside the B.L.E,. & E. 
unit had been solicited for membership and told 
they would, upon joining, qualify for B.L.F. & E. strih 1 
benefits. (R. 1206) Further, the record discloses that 
I 
in prior Kennecott strikes, the B.L.F. & E. vaid strih 
benefits to persons who were not within the bargaining 
unit represented by the B.L.F. & E. (R. 926) 
The record in this case is replete with documentary 
evidence and testimony to the effect that the B.L."B'. & E. 
and its representatives at no time during the organiza-
tional campaign conditioned the payment of strike hene-
fits upon B.L.F. & E. success in that campaign or 
subsequent election or upon any factor other than nwm-
bership in the defendant unions. (R. G89, Fairbanks; 
R 869, 871, 877,, Oneida; R. 901-902, Lawson; R. 976-
977, Hansen; R. 1043, Yates; R. 1048, \Veichert; R.1141, 
Trujillo; R. 1200, 1210, 1217, Iman; R. 1233, 1241, ColP, , 
and Exhibits P-8, 16, 17, 18 21 54 62 and 65) 
Even before all the evidence was in, the defendants 
stipulated that from March 24, 1967, and for a period of 
some three months thereafter, the B.L.F. & K and it' 
representatives represented to the plaintiff that they i 
would be paid strike benefits if they were members in 
good standing and voted for the B.L.F. & E. at thl' 1 
NLRB election regardless of the outcome of the election. 
(R. 1061) Defendants further stipulated that certain 
written "flyers" were circulated to plaintiffs which statPd 
that strike benefits would be paid to members regard-
less of the election results. (R. 670-671) 
8 
TLPrl'aftcr, during the course of tlw trial, A. 11. 
Oilbert, president of B.L.F. & E. admitted that he knew 
thRt tJw 13.L.F. & E. representatiYes were promising 
otrike benefits to the plaintiffs and that he did not 
instrud them to condition that promise upon anything 
otlwr than joining the union. (R. 782-783) L. L. Iman 
l'orroborated the matter by his testimony that he re-
('a!led no one in the Grand Lodge ever telling him that 
there was any condition upon the payment of strike 
lwnefits otlwr than joining the B.L.F. & E. (R. 1217) 
4. The Evidence Supports the Finding that Rep-
resentations and Promises of Strike Benefits 
were made by Authorized Representatives of 
Defendants. 
Contrary to the assertion in defendants' brief that 
L. L. Iman "arrogated to himself" the authority for 
carrying on the F tah organizational campaign of the 
B.L.F. & E., the defendants at trial admitted that there 
\\Pre no \es:-; than thirty-eight B.L.F. & E. field repre-
general organizers and special organizers in-
Yolrl:'d in that campaign. (R. 739-7 40 and Exhibit P-53) 
TliosP organizers, under Art. 2, Sec. 8 of the B.L.F. & E. 
C'umditution, had the express dutie-s of soliciting new 
illf·rnbers, taking application fees and making daily re-
to the International President of the work per-
f\1rn1l'd by them. (Exhibit P-1, pp. 43-44) 
record in this case clearly supports the propo-
:>ition that th0 entirf' Utah organizational campaign was 
(·rmeeind, commenced. and carried out with the knowl-
, ,\g(', arnl pnrsnant to authority of, the defendant Inter-
9 
national. The details of the Utah organizational calll-
paign were initially outlined at a Grand Lodge meeting 
at Lake Tahoe, Nevada, in September 1966. (R. 57-:'iS 
and Exhibit P-85) H. E. Gilbert, B.L.F. & E. President , 
engaged his brother-in-law, L. L. Iman, on a "special 
assignment" to run the Utah organizational campaign. 
(R. 58 and Exhibit P-89A) The various general and 
special organizers of the B.L.F. & E. were told to con-
tact Iman on their arrival in Salt Lake City. (Exhihit8 
P-111, 112, 123) Gilbert assigned B.L.F. & E. field rep-
resentative Morelli to relieve Iman temporarily in Feb-
ruary, 1967 as head of the Utah organizational campaign 
(Exhibits P-106, 107) and it was Morelli who informed 
Gilbert by letter that an unconditional promise of strih 
benefits to all members, regardless of job classification, 
had been made from the very beginning of the campaign. 
(Exhibit P-41) 
E. F. Brehany, International Vice President, who 
attended the March 24, 1967 debate and took no excPp-
tion to the representation made there that B.L.F. & E. 
strike benefits would be paid regardless of the election 
outcome, was sent to that debate on express orders of 
the International president. (R. 1198 and Exhibit P-110) 
There is abundant evidence that, throughout the organi-
zational campaign, L. L. Iman reported in detail on the 
progress of that campaign to Gilbert, the International 
President. (R. 1191-1193 and Exhibits P-85 to P-135) 
Iman testified that he called to Gilbert's attention, either 
orally or in writing, every matter of significance in the 
campaign. (R. 1196) Even as early as November 21, 
1966, Iman sent Gilbert copies of the handbills and flyers 
10 
used in the campaign. (Exhibit P-93) Not only 
did Gilbert have knowledge that strike benefits were 
being promised to prospective new members in Utah, 
lnit J1e personally arranged for Iman to be provided with 
the details of all strike benefits paid to members of 
Lodge S-14 in prior years, so that that information could 
be rn;ed as a recruiting tool. (Exhibit P-109) 
r_r11e defendant International paid all expenses of 
the Utah organizational campaign, which expenses to-
talled $63,569.80. (R. 737 and Exhibit P-47) ,Certain of 
tlw handbills and flyers which promised strike benefits 
wen' in fact prepared by the B.L.F. & E. in Cleveland, 
Ohio, and transmitted to Utah for circulation in the 
eampaign. (R. 758-759, 1103, 1104, and Exhibits P-54, 
GU, and 70) E. F. Brehany, Vice President of the B.L.F. 
b., actively involved himself in circulating to prospec-
tive new members flyers containing strike benefits (R. 
1109-1110), and R. J. Whitlock, a member of the Board 
of Directors of the B.L.F. & E., also participated actively 
in organizational efforts, including the circulation of 
ben<.:>fit materials. (R. 1136-1137) 
Even assuming arguendo that L. L. Iman did not 
have actual authority to make the promises he admittedly 
made with respect to strike benefits, the record is clear 
that Iman had apparent authority to rnake those repre-
Iman assured all Grand Lodge representa-
tives, local lodge members and officers "on many occa-
o-ions" that the payment of strike benefits to all who 
had joined the B.L.F. & E. had been "cleared and ap-
proved by President H. E. Gilbert by telephone." (Ex-
11 
hibit P-8) The president of the defendant local sail! 
that he was told "time after time" that the International 
President had cleared or given approval to the pro-
cedures and statement::; employed in tlw organizational 
campaign. (Exhibit P-51) He further indicated that ht 
had the impression "that the drive was being conducted 
with Grand Lodge approval of all facet::; involwd and 
that I should not question the authority of those in 
charge." (Exhibit P-51) Iman expressly reqne::;ted au-
thority from the International President to promise all 
new members that they would receive strike lwnefits, 
and Gilbert gave him that as::;urance, which was then 
incorporated in a handbill circulated among plaintiffs. 
(R. 756-757 and Exhibits P-41 and D-1G2-Hi3) 
In one handbill circulated among and rt>lit>d upon 
by plaintiffs, it was expressly represented by the Grie\'-
ance Committee of Lodge 844 that it::; members had 
personally spoken to International Pre::;idPnt Gilbert 1 
about B.L.F. & K benefits and had lw<'n adyised tliat 
Gilbert was "giving the whole matter hi::; personal guid-
ance." (R. 1201-1202 and Exhibits P-159 and D-1 ±-I-) On" 
of the most widely distributed flyers nsed hy tlw B.L.F. 1 
& E. in its campaign was a bogus $100 hill Pntitled 
"B.L.F. & E. Money" and containing tltt> pidnre of it' 
International President. That flyer iwrtaintid :-:olelY !11 
strike benefits, and said such benefits wPrP not men\lY 
promised but were "guaranteed." (Exhibit P-60) 
Even if one were to disregard the obvious apparent 
authority of L. L. Iman to bind the B.L.F. & K at tlw ' 
time he acted, it is clear that thoise acts were implied!) 
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iatifiP<l liy tlw Urand LodgP m all respPcb;. (R. 1189, 
Ull. 12:l:!, 123:3) 
:5. The Evidence Supports the Finding That the 
Plaintiffs Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett, 
Carter, James, Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. 
N. Turner are Entitled to Recover Strike Ben-
eits. 
AftN granting defendant:'' motion to dismiss the 
action a:-: against a numbPr of plaintiffs who had failed 
to retain coimsf'I and int<>rvPm' as parties in the action, 
the trial eonrt rnaclc the following ruling with regard to 
tlw ninP afon•rn1111Pd plaintiffs, who defrndants contt•nded 
:-:l1011ld Jw dismissed for failure to timely file interroga-
TlH: COURT: [T j}w motion as to B(•ck, D. 
H<·nnett, (;. Bemiett, Carkr, James, Kt>ndrick, 
T:-:ntsni. Oal<' and Turner will he denied, ho\\·ever, 
if upon tlH• termination of this trial, that is, both 
partiPs n•stinp; tlH•ir cas<', defendant can show any 
pn·.indic<·, the Court \\·ill n•(·onsider said motion 
or <li:-;missal. ( H. 
Plaintiff n•:-;kd its <·as<' on JnnP :23, 19G8 and dP-
fPnda11b l'<'sted tlwir casP on fop next day. (R. 1148, 
UGG) At tlH· time deft>ndants rested, they made no 
nttPmpt whakv('r to show any prejudice caused them 
L1· tlw failnn· of said nine plaintiffs to file interrogatory 
in thP matter. 
DPft>ndants state, at pagP S of their brief, "As the 
n•<·onl starnls, it is eompl0tPly devoid of any evidencp 
.1. liabop\·er with r<>gard to these plaintiffs." On thP 
contrary, these plaintiffs were not excluded from the <le. 
fendants' stipulation, made at the commencement of trial ' 
1 
that strike benefits were promised to all persons ' 
licited for B.L.F. & E. membership during its organiza. 
tional campaign. (R. 671) These nine plaintiffs were 
included on the initial roster of members qualified for 1 
strike benefits, and each signed that ro1ste'r. (Exhibit 
P-75) They were also included on a list specifying tJw 
number of dependents each member had, which was nst><l 
in calculating the amount of strike benefits due. (Ex. 
hib P-76) They were also included on the initial strih 
payroll duly approved by the officials of the B.L.F. & K 
(Exhibit P-78) 
The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that the 
promise of strike benefits was made to all plaintiffs, 
including these nine plaintiffs. (Exhibits P-8, 16, Ji, 
18, 21, 41 and 51) The defendants have interrogated all 
other plaintiffs, eithrr at the trial or by written inter-
rogatories, as to their reliance upon the promisPs of 
strike benefits made to them. (R. 148, 178, 220, 299, 321. 
344, 353, 364, 372, 386, 456 and Interrogatories Nos. 50, 
51, 54, 55, 62, 63, and 64, and the answPrs thereto, H. 
128-129 and 245 et seq.) Defendants cannot cite a single 
instance where a plaintiff did not join the B.L.F. & K 
in reliance, in part at least, upon such an off er of strike 
benefits. In light of that record, it would be complete!)' 
unresaonable to assume that any of these 
having obviously been made the same promises, failed 
to rely upon the same in joining the defendant 
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'I'lwse plaintiffs, like all the others, ·were injured as 
. ·p:,;ult of the defendants' breach of contract and of 
d I. 
ti fiduciary duties owed them, and there is no good .1e 
l'Pason to exclude them from participation in the damage 
award of the trial court. 
6. The Evidence Supports the Findings that the 
Promises of Strike Benefits Were Made 
Throughout the Period of the Organizational 
Campaign. 
Defendants have constn1cted an elaborate argument 
against a contract recovery here, based upon the faulty 
premise that since many of the plaintiffs joined the 
union prior to a certain date when defendants admit they 
were making "guarantees" of strike benefits, those plain-
tiffs cannot be said to have joined in response to those 
gnarantees and promises. However, defendants' argu-
ment completely disregards the abundant documentary 
t•vidence and testimony at trial to the effeet that such 
unconditional in·ornises and guarantees were made not 
on!:, after a certain date, but were made repeatedly by 
thP defrndants throughout the entirt> course of the organ-
izational campaign, from October, 1966, to June, 1967. 
li-lel' Exhibits P-1, 11, 21, 41, 51 72 and 140) 
The record discloses that the organizational cam-
paign cornmencf>d in early October 1966. (Exhibits P-85 
to 91) .T oseph Trujillo, one of the B.L.F. & E. special 
testified that he actively solicited new mem-
hPr::; during the latter months of 1966 as well as the first 
six months of 1967. (R. 1096-1097) The reeord is clear 
tiint various general organizers of the B.L.F. & E. par-
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bcipated actively in the organizational campaign fr 1,111 
December, 1966 on, and that each one of them repeatedly 
represented and promised to the plaintiffs that, if thei 
joined the B.L.F. & E., they would be entitled to l'ecei 1;, 
strike benefits in the event of a strike. (R. 1097 1101,· 
) I 
1136; Exhibits P-8, 11, 16, 18, 21, 41, and 51) 
L. L. Iman, the B.L.F. & E. repn•sentative in chargp 
of the campaign, was questioned "from the very begin-
ning" by one of the B.L.F. & E. general organizel's ahout 
lman's representation that all full dues paying members, 
regardless of job status, would be paid strike be11efits. 
(Exhibit P-41) 
rrhat defendant's representatives informed plantifh 
throughout the entire organizational period that all mem-
bers would receive strike benefits regardless of thl' rr-
sults of the election is most profoundly established by 
the interrogatory answers of 57 of the plaintiffs that 
such a promise was made to them before the <lPhatf' 
of March 24, 1967. (R. 245 et seq.) 
Defendants contend that Exhibit P-54, attached m: 
Exhibit B to the Court's finding number nine,, was not 
distributed until after February 1, 1967, aud that, as a 
i esult, the promise contained therein could only be the 
basis of a contract behveen the defendants and those 
plaintiffs joining the union after that date. This asser-
tion again disregards the uncontroverted testimon)· of 
Joseph Trujillo, who prepared most of the1 handbills and 
flyer material utilized in the organizational rampaign, , 
that Exhibit P-54 was "more widely distrihnfrd tlurn an( 
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i11 distrihukd "many, many times throughout the 
l) 11111/)0l.rJll." (R. 1137-1138) 
'I 
·1· Finally, defendants' contention that it was not until 
11 
' :iiti·r February 1, 1967, that promises of strike benefits 
rnadP to tlw plaintiff::-; even disregards the stipula-
of n•cord ht>rein that tlw B.L.F. & E. representa-
prorni:sed strike bPnefits to tht• plaintiffs "during 
rlii· iwriod of the campaign commencing in September 
11f rnii() and through .Jnnp 20th, 1967." (R. 671and1060-
lilli1) 
7. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the 
Plaintiffs were Engaged in a Strike Authorized 
by the B.L.F. & E. 
Tlw ddendants contend that the plaintiffs ,,·pn• not 
engaged in a strike at Kennecott which was authorized 
l1y tlw B.L.F. & E. Certainly there can be no question 
that the plaintiffs werP engaged in a strike. (R. 1061) 
Thns the only qpsution is whether that strike was author-
w·d liy th<· B.L.F'. & E. II. K Gilbert, PrPsidPnt of the 
Juternational, issuPd the strike call of Kennecott. (R. 
Contrary to his kstirnony that he called a strike 
11t thotSe men in the bargaining unit represented by the 
H.L.F. & E. (R. 794-795), Gilbert's actual strike authori-
zation, in thP form of a telegram to Mr. E. F. Brehany, 
11ns not so limited, and expressl)· granted authority for 
111d.i!;t' and its nwmbers to go on strike effective July 
L\ 1 %7. (Exhibit P-138) Plaintiffs were, of course, 
of 1,odge 844 and were therefore included in 
!liat strih call. 
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All members of Lodge 844, including th(} plaintiffs, 
were notified by their lodge officers of the strike ca]] 
I 
and all were told to report for B.L.F. & E. picket duty, 
(R. 141-142) Defendants stipulated that the 
reported to the B.L.F. & E. strike headquarters and 
signed for and served picket duty for the B.L.F. & R 
(R. 1061) The plaintiffs, while serving such picket duty 
'I 
carried a placard announcing they were on strike on 
behalf of the B.L.F. & E. (Exhibit P-73) 
Defendants' statement in its brief that the plaintiffs 
were authorized to go on strike by the Mine-Mill Union 
is competely unsupported. On the contrary, the defend-
ants by interrogatory asked the plaintiffs whether they 
were called out on strike by the Mine-Mill or any union 
other than the B.L.F. & E., and plaintiffs ovenvhelm 
ingly answered in the negative. (Defendants' Interroga-
toeirs 12, 33 and 35, R. 124, 126 and answers thereto, 
R. 245 et seq.) 
8. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the 
Plaintiffs Were Initially Included on a Duly 
Certified and Authorized B.L.F. & E. Strike 
Payroll. 
The defendants contend that Exhibit P-78, the ini-
tial strike payroll, was not a valid and duly authorized 
payroll. To the contrary, nothing in this record is mon 
clear than the validity of that payroll under the <lefen<l-
ants' own rules pertaining thereto. 
The defendant B.L.F. & E., in its Constitution (.\rt. 
10, Sec. 3 (f), (g) and (h)) specifically sets forth tlw 
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mechanics for proper approval of a strike payroll. Those 
constitutional provisions state that bank payroll forms 
an' to br filled out by the local lodge, certified by the 
president, local chairman and recording secretary, ap-
proved by the Chairman of the General Grievance Com-
lllittee and tht> Grand Lodge representative assigned to 
take chargr of the strike, and then forwarded to the 
Seerdary and Treasurer of the B.L.F. & E. for 
issuanee of strike benefit checks. (Exhibit P-1, p. 197) 
The record in this case shows that all requisites for 
11roper certification and approval of the payroll were 
with in every respect. The Local Lodge 844 
rPeeiwd blank forms; the names of all striking 
employees, including all plaintiffs except Messrs. Oliver, 
('. Turner and Uliberri, were entered therPon, with the 
number of dependents for each employee and the amount 
of strikt> benefits due each set opposite his respective 
name. (Exhibit P-78) This was done by Martin Jensen, 
financial Recretary of Lodge 844. (R. 918) The strike 
Jiayroll, Exhibit P-78, with the names of the plaintiffs 
i11clndt>d with the three exceptions noted, was certified 
11" tlw PresidP-nt (Yoylt> M. Fairbanks), Local Chair-
man (Warren D. Cole) and Recording Secretary of Local 
"44 (Glen R. Draper). P-78 was then forwarded to the 
Chairman of the General Grievance Committee (Warren 
n Cole), who, along with the B.L.F. & E. representative 
in charge of the strike (E. F. Brehany), expressly 
11J!Jmncd the same by affixing their signatures thereto, 
and forwardt>d it to the B.L.F. & E. General Secretary 
and Treasurer (R. R. Bryant). (R. 918-919, 942-944, 
946-948) 
] !) 
Glen R. Draper, Recording 8ecretary of Lodge 
testified as follows with respect to the propriety of thf: 
certification and approval procedures followed: 
Q. Now, do you know of an:v l'l-'S]Jl'd in whi('/i 
strike payroll Exhibit No. P-78 was handk·d and 
administered that was not in strict eonforrnih 
·with the provisions of Article 10 of the Consti. 
tntion 1 
THE WITNESS: As far as I ronl<l deter-
mine, it was processed as nearl)' as J>o:-;sible ac-
cording to the rules laid dmvn for it in the Con-
stitution. (R. 948) 
Article 10 of the B.L.F. & E. Constitution n•qniw 
that, when the steps specified for proper payroll c<'rtifi-
cation and approval have been taken, as tlwy ·were i11 
this case, the General Secretary and rL'reasmer ":)ll!lll 
issue checks from the General Fund for tlw amonnt <ln1· 
and persons whose names appear on the certified !Jay. 
rolls." Plaintiffs, with the threl::' exceptions noted, ap-
peared on that duly certified payroll, P-78. The de-
fendants' president, H. E. Gilbert, improperly strnck 
plaintiffs from P-78, as Article 10 Section 3 ( h) of tl1P 
Constitution makes issuance of strikP benefit to 
persons listed on a certified payroll 11rn 11rlu to»y and pro-
vides no authority to H. E. Gilbert or anyone else to 
interfere with the prescribed proc<'ss for of 
strike benefits once- a strike payroll has been constitu-
tionally certified. (Exhibit P-1, page 197) 
Defendants' assertion that the initial payroll wa, 
invalid because it contained the names of persons, inclwl-
ing the plaintiffs, not in the bargaining unit reprcsenkcl 
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1,1 tlie <l<>f!,ndants, is contrary to evidt·nce as well 
rn<·.onsistrnt with th<j B.L.F. & Constitution. As 
indi('.atl'd ahove, the record discloses that persons out-
,jdi· tlw H.L.F. & K hargaining unit wen· solicited for 
ntPmlwrship and told \Vould receiH strike benefits 
(R. 120ti) and B.L.F. & E., in prior Kennecott strikes, 
paid strike ht'nefits to persons who were not within its 
bargaining nnit (R. 92G). Furthermore, Martin C. Jen-
finaneial sPcretan· of tlH' defendant local and the 
pPrson who prepared the initial strike payroll, testifif'd 
that lw Pxpressly informf'd officers of the B.L.F. & E. 
h: letter that hP had included all the new nwmhPrs on 
foat payroll nndPr an assumed, and perhaps improper, 
oernpational designation. Despite such notice, which was 
ap1wndPd to the payroll itself, the authorized officials 
of thl' B.L.F. & E. approved that payroll. (R. 920 and 
Exhibit P-78) 
9. The Evidence Supports the Finding that De-
fendants Did Not Inquire Regarding, Nor Dis-
qualify, Anyone from Strike Benefits as a 
Result of Outisde Earnings During the Period 
of the Strike. 
For a complete discussion of the record on these 
math,'rs, :-;ep Point V below. 
10. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the 
Defendants and Their Officers Had a Fidu-
ciary Duty to Plaintiffs. 
1t is quite true as ddendants contend, that the Con-
of the B.L.F. & creates a strict fiduciary 
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duty between the defendant Grand Lodge and itti ine111_ 
bers with respect to the administration of all member-
created funds from which benefits, including strike bene-
fits, are paid (Exhibit P-1, pp. 195-199). Those provi-
sions require strike benefits to be paid, without discriin-
ination, "to each member and non-member engaging in 
a legal strike authorized by this organization." (Art. 10, 
Sec. 3(a), Exhibit P-1, p. 195) As indicated above, thP 
plaintiffs did engage in a strike at Kennecott which 
authorized by the B.L.F. & E. (See Section 7) They 
were thus entitled to receive said strike benefits, just the 
same as all other members of Lodge 844 who were Pn-
gaged in the same strike, and defendants' refusal to 
pay plaintiffs such benefits, while paying them to the 
other members of Lodge 844, constitutes a clear breach 
of the strict fiduciary duty contained in the· B.L.F. & E. 
Cons ti tu ti on. 
11. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the 
Defendants Knowingly Made False Promises of 
Strike Benefits to the Plaintiffs. 
Without any support whatever in thP record, <le-
fendants assert that the Grand Lodge officers of the 
B.L.F. & E. had no knowledge that unconditional strike 
benefit promises were being made until "well after tlw1 
had been made and the strike had begun." As indicated 
in Section 4 above, the record in this case clearly estab-
lishes that the B.L.F. & E. officers, and particular!: 
the International President Gilbert, knew as early as 
November 21, 1966 that such unconditional promises of 
strike benefits were being made, and they contimwd h1 
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lw so informed throughout the entire course of the organ-
izational campaign. (Exhibits P-41, 51, 54, 60, 70, 93, 
109, D-144, 162, 163) Furthermore certain of those offi-
eials thPmselves actively participated in certain aspects 
ot the organizational campaign in Utah including the 
cirenlabon of written strike benefit offers. (R. 1109-
1110, 1136-1137) 
The endants' assertion becomes preposterous in 
light of the nncontroverted evidence that E. F. Brehany, 
International Vice-President, participated in the very 
dl'hate in March, 1967 at which defendants have stipu-
lated unconditional promises of strike benefits were 
made. (R. 1061, 1198) 
With respect to that portion of the trial court's 
Firnling N um her Twenty that defendants knowingly 
allowed unconditional strike benefit promises to be, made 
to plaintiffs with no intention of fulfilling the same, 
it is significant that the defendants allowed the plain-
tiffs from at least March 24, 1967 to the commencement 
nf the strike on July 15, 1967 to believe that they would 
n'reive such promised strike benefits. Having knowledge 
for that fifteen-week period that such unconditional 
promise of strike benefits had been made to plaintiffs, 
dt'fendants at no time within that period informed plain-
ti ffa that they would not be paid such benefits. (R. 1233-
Yet, during that period defendants accepted dues 
from thP plaintiffs and required them to perform all 
dutiPs of membership. (R. 1057, 1060-61, and Exhibit 
P-77) The record is uncontroverted on this matter, and 
:twh unconscionable conduct clearly supports the lower 
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court's finding that the deft>ndants, in that res1wct, 
in bad faith. 
As shown above, each of the findings of fact upon 
which the judgment below is based is amply sn1)}JOl'(pcJ 
by the evidence, and therefore the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed in all respects. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN ITS 
FINDING THAT VALID CONTRACTS HAD 
BEEN ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFFS AND 
DEFENDANTS. THE TERMS OF THE AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN THE UNlON AND PLAIN-
TIFFS WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE U N I 0 N CONSTITUTION. 
FURTHER, THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
ITS FINDING THAT THE CONTRACTS EN-
TERED INTO BY THE UNION'S REPRESENTA-
TIVES WERE BINDING UPON THE UNION. 
1. The Agreement Entered into by Plaintiffs and 
the Defendants was not Prohibited by any Pro-
vision of the Union Constitution. 
The trial court found, after consideration of 
tive evidence presented by both parties, that: 
[A] uthorized representatives of dt>f endanb l'P]l-
resented to plaintiffs that the,\- 'voul<l be paid 
strike benefits rpgardless of tlie outcome of tlir 
then forthcoming election .... at no tinw during 
said campaign did defendants or an,\' of tli(•ir 
said authorized representatives condition thr 
rnent of said strike benPfits upon BLF&E 
in said representation campaign or e!Petion or 
upon any factor otlwr than plaintiffs' HH'll11JPr-
ship .... (Findings of Fact, 6.) 
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'l'lw eonrt further found: 
Fla.intiffs, induct>d by and in reliance upon these 
and other offers, representations and guaranties, 
and particularly those regarding strike benefits, 
ae<·eptPd said off em, joined as members of de-
fendants and thereafter performed all obligations 
and dutiPs required of members, including pay-
wPnt of dnes, attendance at llllc'etings, and service 
of ]Jicht (Findings of Fact, 7.) 
The dPtails of the repn•sentations made by def end-
nnts' reprPsentatives are set forth at pp. 7-13, supra. 
ll is rrnffieient here to reiterate that defendants' repre-
H·ntatiws nnequivocally promised plaintiffs that, in the 
evrnt of a strike, tlwy would be entitled to recein' strike 
hPnrfits regardless of the election's outcome and that, in 
reliance u1rnn those representations, plaintiffs rendered 
to rlefe11dants all the duties of union membership, in-
<'lucling of dues and performance of strike duty. 
Dt•fendants have argued at pp. 16-21 of their Open-
ing· Brief that because Article 10, Section 3(a) of the 
H.L.F. & E. constitution provided that strike benefits 
lit' paid to nwmbers and non-members engaged in a "legal 
drih authorized by [the union]," that plaintiffs were 
110t t'ntitlt>d to receive strike benefits. 
Dt>f Pndants contend, without judicial support, that 
thr term ''legal strike authorized by this organization" 
a term of art as used in the context of labor-manage-
nwnt n·lations (Def. Br. p. 16), the effect of which is to 
''Xdude tlw plaintiffs from any class entitled to receive 
lwnefits. Any promisP to pay benefits to a broader 
C'lass, they contend, is contrary to the constitution. 
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Defendants' contention is fatally defective on S\·i· 
eral counts. First, it is clear from the terms of Artick 
10, Section 3, that subsection 3(a) is not snfficient to 
bar binding promises to pay strike benefits to mernbl'I"' 
not within the bargaining unit. Article 10, 8t>ction 3(P) 
states: 
The provisions of this Section conct>rning thP 
payment of strike benefits is only anil 
shall not be the basis of any legal liahilih' 011 
this part of the Brotherhood. · 
Further, Section 3 (b) of Article 10 states: 
It shall be the policy of the organization to in. 
elude as eligible to receive strike lwnefits undtr 
the provisions of this Section members and non. 
membe·rs on lea,·e of absence or furloughed fro111 
service ... who respond to the strike call in thl' 
manner of assisting in manning of picket lines. 
. . . ; [further,] the payment of strike hem·fit> 
as prescribed in Paragraph (a) to es1wcially de. 
serving employees or members who aid t/11 
Brotherhood in a strike, may he authorized by tlw 
International President with the concnrrenrl' of 
the Finance Committe<-'. [Emphasis added.l 
It is clear from the foregoing that: ( l) S<>ction 
3(a), and any limitations on payment of strike 
which it may imply, is directory only and dol>S not har 
the union or an authorized represPntati\'(' thPrPof frnlli 
promising or granting strike bem·fits to not 
enumerated in subsection (a); (2) Section 3(h) W 
cifically authorizes and announces as a matter of union 
policy the granting of strike benefits to mPmhPrn or 
non-members who perfonn picket duty or who arP "esp1" 
cially deserving" and aid the Brotherhood in a strike 
26 
'l'Jw int<'nt of tJ1is subsection obviously is to authorize 
paynwnt of strike benefits to persons who assist the 
union in a strike who might not come within the coverage 
ul F1cctio11 3(a). 
J 
E\·en if the promises - which the trial court found 
ereated a binding contract - could b0 limited by the 
krms of tlw nnion constitution, the terms of Article 10, 
f'Pction :3 definitely did not preclude payment of strike 
Jieiwfits to plaintiff8. Any contrary interpretation of 
the constitution by the International President is clearly 
incorrect. 
2. Plaintiffs, as Union Members, were Entitled to 
Strike Benefits Equal to Those of Other Mem-
bers Similarly Situated. 
Plaintiffs not only were eligible for strike benefits 
nrnler the union constitution, tlH'Y were, as union mem-
lH·r:-; and strikP participants, e·ntitled to benefits equal 
to of other striking memher8 of the Brotherhood 
similarly situated. ThP obligation of a union to repre-
sent and art on behalf of all members of the same bar-
gaining nnit in a fair and non-discriminatory manner 
wt>ll-established. Conley u. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 
:-;.ct. 99. 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Williams v. Yellow Cab 
Cn, F.:2<l ::0:2 Cir. cert. denied, 346 US. 
:-:-io (1953); Cherico v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 
i(i7 F. Supp. G35 (8.D.N.Y. 1958). Further, it has been 
1iPJ(1 that a union may not, in representation of workers 
; 11 om· bargaining lm1on, so <lPport itself as to invade 
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the rights of other workers not in the bargaining nnit. 
Brother{wod of R.R. Trainmmz v. Howard, 343 l1.S. 
774, 72 S.Ct. 1022, 96 L.Ed 1283 (1952). ' 
3. Plaintiffs Would Be Entitled to the Strike Ben-
efits Promised by the Union's Representatives 
Even if Those Representations Were at Vari-
ance with the Union Constitution. 
It is not necessary, however, to establish that plain-
tiffs were entitled, by virtue of their union membership 
alone, to recovery of s.trike benefits or that such promises 
were consistent with the union constitution. The 
made to them by the union's field representatives con-
stitute a contract between plaintiffs and defendant,. 
(Conclusions of Law, § 4.) As has been pointed out at 
pp., 2-3, supra, defendants' field rt>prentativPs stated 
to the plaintiffs in clear and unequivocal language that 
the promises made to them were consistent with tlw 
union constitution. In fact, the representatives stated 
that the benefits were guaranteed by the constitution. 
( R. 396-397) 
It is a general rule that a party, \d10 having pn-
pared the contract in question, makes an explicit (or, 
in some cases, an implied) represPntation of the con-
tract's contents under circumstances whPre it is reason-
able to assume that the other party will upon thosP 
representations (especially when the other party is of 
imited education or when the contract provisions tHI' 
vague or difficult for the ordinary layman to comprc-
henr), he wil be bound by those representations P\Pll 
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il tJie:· an' at \'anance with the written instrument. A 
1 arianc·(· bL·tween the representations of defendants' 
iqire:-::tmtatives and the terms of the union constitution, 
if ;:;iwh a ,·ariance exists, must be resolved so as to pre-
st·n·e th<:> pro111iss<:>es' t>xpected benefits. If union mem-
ber:o:hip creates a contractual relationship, as defendants 
eontend it does (Br., p. 30), this general rule must apply. 
lt "1rnld he lndicrous to expect men of plaintiffs' limited 
l'ducation and expt>rience to have knowledge of the "terms 
nf art/' (Br. p. Hi) intricacies of the Labor Management 
l\Platiom; Act (Id., p. 17), and details of the proceedings 
111' the 33rd through 39th International Conventions of 
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen 
(Id., pp. 19-21) upon which defendants base their inter-
pretation of the constitution. Indeed, defendants, in this 
section, han' failed to cite a single sentence of the con-
which would put an ordinary man on notice of 
Pn·n a potential variance between the organizers' prom-
and the terms of the constitution. 
ln .employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. v . 
. 1/wfric, ;}-1: Dt>l. 1-l:G, 17-1: A.2d 809 (Del. Super. 1961), 
'1111111wn; .i ud!JllU'nt ret·'d, 54 Del. 593, 183 A.2d 182 
! the court found that plaintiff was a "somewhat 
1mtutorPd and unsophisticated man" who had stated his 
i11o:urnnce net>ds to an agent if the Liability Assurance 
Corporation and that the agent had represented the 
poliey to Madric as providing the coverage he sought. 
,\I adrir hast>d his decision to purchase that and no other 
npon the agent's representation. 174 A.2d at 810-
\..1 l. Tlwrd'ore, the company was bound by its agent's 
i':i l l'P f ll'E'SPntations. 
The California Supreme Court, in Steven v. Fideliti 
& Casualty Co. if N.Y., 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 
58 iCal. 2d 362 N.Y. (1962) ( accord, Lachs v. Fidelity & 
Casualty Co. of N. Y., 30G N. Y. 357, 118 N.K2d 550 
(1954); Fidelity & Casualty Co. uf N. Y. r. Smith, rn!J 
F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1951)), found d<>fendant insuranei: 
company liable for coverage on a decedent who died in 
the crash of an unscheduled "air taxi" even though the 
policy set out across the top: NOT FOR TRA YEL OX 
OTHER THAN SCHEDULED AIR D1·-
cedent has substituted the charter service for a rt-gular 
carrier when his scheduled flight was cancelled. The 
court found that it was not certain that decedent could 
have made out the qualification before purchasing the 
policy from the vending machine. More important, it 
found that an ordinary traveler could not be expected to 
know the technical difference between sclwdnled and non-
scheduled carriers and that the insurer should have fore-
seen the probability of an occasional passegrn·r sub8ti-
tuting non-scheduled transportation. It was held that the 
customer had ''bargained for protection for the whole, 
not part of, the trip." 377 P.2d at 17G. 
The insurance contract had included a definition of 
"scheduled carrier" 'in the policy. Howt•ver, tht> conrt 
observed that this definition was only one clause in a 
2,000-word contract and held that this definition wa' 
no binding because the clause was "inconspicuous" anil 
"unclear." 27 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82. 
The court concluded: 
If [defendant] deals with tlw publie on a ma.'; 
basis, the notice of non-coverage of the polic> 111 
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a situation in which the pnhlic may reasonably 
Pxpeet covPrage must be conspicuous, plain and 
dc•ar." 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182. 
'l'lw N t>W .Jersey Supreme Court, m Henningsen v. 
Bioomfi<lrl Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) 
drew support from the principles of the airline insurance 
('<lSPS in voiding a manufacturer's disclaimer of warranty 
and holding that a buyer possesses an implied warranty 
of reasonable fitness if he makes known to the seller the 
particular purpose for which the article is required and 
it appears that he has relied upon the seller's skill and 
jndgnwnt. 161 A.2d at 76, 93-94. 
In Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co. v. Farm Air 
8cr?'Ce, l11c., 255 F.2d G58 (5th Cir. 1958), the court held 
tl1at an ambiguous exclusion of fire coverage from an 
insnrance contract was void against insured where it 
was clear from the parties' negotiations that plaintiff 
liad dPsired and thonght that he had purchased a con-
trnet wliieh included fire coverage. 
In the instant cast>, plaintiffs were told through 
dt>f Pndant's handbills that strike benefits were guaranteed 
tlwrn. They were told later that the benefits were guar-
mitt>Pd by tlw union constitution. The constitution, to 
\Yhirh most did not han• access until a later date, is 305 
nagps long. The section regarding strike benefits is 
fairl>· ('omplicatPd and well over 1,000 words in length. 
Tt is n•asonahle to expect that a man of limited educa-
tion, e\'Pn if he read the pertinent provisions, would have 
1H• mkling of a potential disparity between the union's 
1·1·presentations and the constitution's contents. 
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Plaintiffs' comprehension of their bargain with tJip 
union undoubtedly was determined by what they read 
in union campaign leaflets and what they were told by 
union personnel. These plaintiffs are entitled to thP 
same rights against the promisor union that other plain-
tiffs have been accorded against commercial 
Indeed, the reliance and expectations of both 
of plaintiffs is nearly identical. 
4. Plaintiffs' Rights Arisng from the Promises of 
Union Representatives Cannot be Negatived by 
a Disclaimer of Legal Liability in the Union 
Constitution. 
Defendants' representatives characterized th Pi r 
promises as "guarantees." In common speech, the word 
''guarantee'' indicates a binding promise and when it is 
used in that sense, the courts will interpret it as express-
ing "an intention to warrant, insure, covenant, pledge 
or promise to be bound to perform.'' Northern Imp. Co. 
v. Pembina Broadcasting Co., 157 N.\¥.2d 97, 103 (N.D. 
1967). Accord, Conkling v. Standard Oil Co., 116 N.W. 
822, 824, 138 Iowa 596 (1906). Such terminology is com-
pletely inconsistent with any attempt to negah> those 
promises through an excldpatory clanse. 
Exculpatory clauses are to he constnwd stridl) 
against the party drafting the coutrnct. This rule ha) 
special force in those cases in which the contract was one 
of adhesion rather than negotiation. This rule is well 
Pstablished in Utah. In Seal i:. Tayco, Inc., 16 lTtah 
323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965), where seller had failed to deliY-
er the quantity of goods required by agreement, seller\ 
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r. 1111 tract eontaiued a provision excusing him from liabil-
ity for any delays or defaults by reason of fire, floods, 
acts of Go<l, labor troubles, inability to secure raw mate-
nals, acts of government, or other causes beyond reason-
nhle control. The second sentence thereafter added: 
"ln no eyent shall seller be liablt> for special or 
con:,a·qnential damages." 
'!'lie Supreuw Conrt found the disclaimer of liability for 
,pecial or consequential damages susceptible to two in-
tl·qiretatiom;: that it gave selll'r blanket protection 
ap;ainst an;· claim of special or consequential damages 
or that it prokcti•d him only against damages resulting 
from dela.'· caused by fin', flood, acts of God, etc. In 
adopting tht> limited interpretation, the Court 
[I]t manifest!:· unfair to iwnnit 01w who 
fonnulatt>s a contract to so fashion it as to mislead 
the other party by setting forth a clearly apparent 
prornisP or l'PJffPsentation in order to induce ac-
<·epta1H'P, and tlwn de>signedly "burying" elsewhere 
in tht> docnllH'nt, in fim• print, provisions which 
pmport to limit or take awa;· the promise>, and/or 
pn·el u<lP rPeover;· for failure to fulfill it. Hi Utah 
at :)'.2(i. 
'L'lie N l'\\' York Co mt of Appeals held in the Lachs 
Slljmt, 1 rn 2d at 559 that 
th<• hmd<'n ... is on the defendant [insurer] to 
Pstablish that tlw words and Pxpressions not 
on!.\· an• snsct>ptible of the construction sought 
.. but that it is the only construction which may 
f11ir111 /J(' placed 011 them. (Emphasis added.) 
rl1l1e uffrd of the allegPd exculpatory language in de-
l'r·nd:u1t's ('Onstitution is no different than that in the 
r·rintruet,_ in thP above cases. 
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5. The Defense of Ultra Vires is Not Available 
to the Defendants. 
The trial court, having found as a matter of fael 
that a particular representation constituted the ba8i8 of 
plaintiffs' reliance, that finding should be allowed to 
stand. The defense of ultra vires is not available to a non. 
profit corporation under Utah law. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 16-6-23 states: 
Defense of ultra vires - No act of a non-profit 
corporation and no comTeyance or transfer of rPal 
or personal property to or by such corporation 
shall be invalid by reason of the fact that tlw cor-
poration was without capacity or power to do 
such act or to make or receive such conYFyancc 
or transfer .... [The statute states several excep-
tions to the rule, none of which are applicable 
to the present case.] 
Although Utah has no separate statute governmg 
unincorporated associations, the 'ultra vires defense is a 
creature of corporation law. The Business and Non-
Profit Corporation Acts set forth an unambiguous policy 
that corporations should not be permitted this dPfeme 
against plaintiffs suing on contracts with them. There is 
no sound policy dictating a different rule in the case of 
unincorporated associations. Indeed, a trade union, rwn 
though unincorporated, "is for many purposes gin•n tl1L' 
rights and subjected to the obligations of a legal entit>·.'' 
International Ass'n of 1Vlachinists v. Gon.zales, 35G 
617, 619, 78 S. Ct. 923 (1958). 
The only cases cited by defendants which deal spr-
cifically with the availability of the 'ultra vires 
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tn a trade union are Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. 
Kiser, 174 Ya. 229, G S.E. 2d 562 (1939), and United 
IJllll. uf Carpenters and Joinders v. Moore, 206 Va. 6, 141 
s.K 2d 729 (1965). Neither decision could have been 
consistently with U'l1AH CODE ANN. § 16-6-23. 
the theory of union government which underlies 
hoth decisiom; is at variance with better-reasoned deci-
rn1e Kiser decision, which the Moore court consider-
i'd dispositive of Virginia law on the subject, was render-
·d by diYided court. The dissent regarded the majority 
opinion as gravely unrealistic and ignoring the "close 
analogy ... between the constitution of a voluntary 
association, like the defendant, and the charter of an 
ordinary business corporation." 6 S.E. 2d at 567. 
The more up-to-date rule governing trade unions 
was set forth in MoonPy v. Bartenders Union Local No. 
::38, 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P.2d 857 (1957): 
The court will . . . act in a proper case for the 
purpose of protecting the property rights of a 
mern her of unincorporated association and will, 
enfoce, so far as practical, the rulPs apply to 
incorporatf•d bodies of the same character. 313 
358 . 
. Justice 'l'obriner, writing for a unanimous California 
Court in Daniels v. Sanitarium Association, Inc., 
:iri Cal. 2d 602, 30 Cal. Rptr. 828, 381 P.2d (1961) dis-
mis8ed the theory that trade unions should be treated as 
lllPre 8ocial groups as "obscurantism" "fraught with 
latPnt unfairnt>ss and patent difficulties." 30 Cal. Rptr. at 
"31. '·rrl1e old approach," he wrote, regarded all members 
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of tlw union as principals and agents or partners .... 
After analyzing the emerging entity status of a labrir 
union, we [have] concluded that the old rule could nu 
longer be applied to unions. Id at 830-831. Tlw opinion 
went on to reiterate, with obvious approval, tlil• 11oldina 
' of Justice Dooling in Marshall v. lnternatio1i.a1l Long-
shoremen' s and TV a re housemen's Union. 57 Cal. 2cl I'll, 
22 Cal. Rptr. 211 371 P.2d 978 (1966): 
It is obvions that [labor unions] are no lonopr 
b 
comparable to volnntan- fraternal ordPrs (}J' 
partnerships; that the)· sui ge•nesis, and ap 
proxirnat(• corporations in their 01wrations allll 
powpn; ... To comsidPr such organization::; n11cl1·1 
prPsent day conditions as nwre social or frat\'mal 
orders or partnerships is to close one's eyes to 
the rPalities now existing. 57 Cal. at 
22 Cal. Rptr. at 215, 371 P.2d at 91. 
Justice Dooling added that wlwn partnt>rship eon-
cepts are transf errt>d to • 
labor unions, which normally act through 
officers and in which individual mernhns kn 1 
little or no anthorit)· in da)·-to-da)· operations of 
the association's affairs, reality is apt to lw ,.;ani-
fieed for literary formalism. The eomts. in r1T-
ognition of this fact, have from case to casP grad-
ual!)- t>volvPd new tht>ories approaching tlw proL-
h·ms of sneh associations, and tlwrt> is no11· an·-
speetable body of judicial decisions, espPeialh 111 
the labor union field .... ·which recop:nized tl1 1 
existPnCf' of nnincorporatt>d and associations nnrl 
labor unions as separatt> entities for a yari1•t1 pf 
pnrpos<>s. 57 Cal. 2d at 7H3-7S4, Cal. Rptr. ul 
213, 371 P.2d at 989. Accord, Oi.l lVorkl'rs I 11/1'1;111 
tionol Union 'C. Sitpr'rior Court, 10;3 Cal. App. 
512, 2:30 P.2d 71 (1951 ), !uglis v. Opcratin(t F11n1 
11!'ers Local No. 12, 58 Cal. 2d 2G!J, Cal. 
403, 373 p .2d 467 ( 1962). 
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ln 7· 111ted Stntrs r. H1 1tite, 1;.s. G9±, G± S. Ct. 
U±S, L. Ed. 1542 (1944), tlw Statt>s Supreme 
Court ohsen·ed: 
Strndmally and fnnctionall:·, a labor union is an 
institution whid1 im·olw:-; more than the> private 
and per:-;onal intere:-;ts of it:-; uwmlwn;. . . . The 
nnion's Pxist<>nc<· in fact, and for some purposes 
in lmr, i:-; l!S perpetual as taht of any coqwration. 
Tn a n·cent decision, dismissing the claims against 
tlw nffiel'rs of a trade union, the Court, in Aktinsun r. 
Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 F.S. 238, 82 S. Ct. 1318, 8 L. Ed. 2d 
3:11 (1%:.!), s1weificall:· applied the corporate analogy 
to a labor union. The Con rt held that SPction 301 (b) 
of thP Labor-Management Act of 19-1:7, ''evidences a Con-
gressional intent that a union as an entirety, like a corpo-
ration, Jw tlw s ole source of recovery for injnn· inflich•d 
it." 8till rnore n·cently, the Court obsened: "LT]he 
labor movPnwnt has grown up and must assmnP ordinary 
respon:-;ihilitie:-;." J,i11n r. I'la11t Ouard Wkrs. of America. 
l.ocul Xo. 114, :iG3 56, G3, SG S. Ct. 657 (1966). 
D(•ff:>nda11t:-;' position that a trade union should be 
i11m11nw to liabilit:" for allegedly ultra i·ires acts of its 
agents is outdat(•d and wholl:· unjustifiable. It has no 
in Ftah law and defendants are unable 
to a :-;ingl<' practical or eqnitable rPason why tlH· 
11rineiplP should lw adopt\:'d in this jurisdiction. Neither 
thp NUJH'Pllle Court of the enitPd States nor the Supreme 
C'1Jurt of California have found that such claims the least 
111eritorious, in viPw of modern conditions. In fact, the 
"
11
P court dPfrndants cite as upholding their proposition 
ilid c;o liy onl)· a narrow margin. 
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POINT III 
'PHE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN ITS 
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS CONTRACT 
CLAIMS COULD PROPERLY BE ADJUDICAT-
Em BY A COURT OF LAW. 
1. A Trade Union is Accorded No "Special Treat-
ment" Insofar as its Contractual Obligations to 
its Members are Concerned. 
29 U.S.C. § 411 states: 
No labor organization shall limit the right of am 
member thereof to institute an action in any com:t 
. . . irrespective of whether or not th(; lallllr 
organization or its officers are named as defod-
ants or respondents in such action or proePeding 
1'he plain import of the above statnte is to JffPrlnde 
"special treatment" of a labor nnion when ih; rnernlw1» 
seek adjudication of their legal rights. 
Since the enactment of Section 411, the eon 
sistently have held that a nnion nwrnber ma:-.- sePk 
covery in tlw courts for violation of those right:' whieli 
deYolve upon him by operation of law. Those in 
eluded his rights under the Labor-Management 
Act. Nelson u. Jolvnson, 212 F. Snpp. 233 (D. 
aff'd., 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). The Unikd fltate.' 
Suprem(' Court has held, even prior to the enatruwn 1 
of Section 411, that a union member has recourse to tlw 
courts for a breach of contract between him and the union 
It held that a nnion which wrongfnll,\- expelled a mPmhei 
was guilty of breach of contract and was suhj<>ct to thal 
ml•mbPr's recourse to the state of California. Gn11-
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I .. ,. International Assn. of Machinists, 1±2 Cal. App. ·ii I' t • 
207. 298 P.2d 92, 99 (195G), aff'd., 35G U.S. 617, 78 S. 
l't. %, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1098 ( 1958). Accord, Lockridge v. 
JJ1rn1r;anwted Assn. of Street, Electrical, Bailway and 
.l/otor Coach Employees of America, 369 P.2d 1006 
( I<lal10 19G2). 
'L'he cases cited hy appellants in support of their 
r·initPntion that unions are Pntitled to ''special treatment" 
all involved questions of internal union policy, rather than 
contracts between the union and a member thereof. In 
Cnited Glass Workers, Local No. 188 r. Seitz, 399 P.2d 
it ("\V as11. 1905), the court refused to enforce a fine 
\('ried by the union upon a defendant for violation of the 
union eonstitution. In that cmw, the court held that 
"\rhere the parties to a contract foresee a condition wl1ich 
ma:· dewlop and provided in their contract a remedy for 
the hawening of that condition, the presmnption is that 
thP parti«s inh'nded tht> prescri.hed remedy as the sole 
rt>medy ... and this ]ffesmuption is controlling where 
therP is nothing- in the contract ibelf or in the circum-
'bl.11c:e1-: snrronnding its execution that ne-cessitatt-s a 
diffnf'nt <·onclusion.'' Tht> \Yashington Supreme Court 
f( garded thP diseiplinary provisions of the union condi-
tion,; as tltP "qlliYalent of arbitration clanses. It is not 
iwcessary to rlwPll npon tlw differences hetwet>n a penalty 
prescrilwd by a nnion constitution for a specific act and 
an m1fores1•pn eam:p of action arising out of a 
SPparatp contract ert>ated between a union and a prospec-
tiw lllPH1h<>1-. The other cases cited by appellants in 
:,Hpport of tlwir proposition that the "right of a labor 
111·i.;anization as a voluntary association to administer 
39 
its rnles is ... sacred" all pre-date tlw ('Jlad111<>nt 1,: 
Section -111 of the LMRA and all im·olved rrt 
purely intPrnaJ union policy. Clearclmul Urcl1csfro (' 0111 
mitter 1,·. Cleaveland Fed. of illnsicirN1s, et al., :m:i P.2d 
229 (6th Cir. 1962) and Dyer r. Occidental Life Jn,. 
Co., 182 F.2d 127 UHh Cir. 1950) both inrnh·<' cliallPng-P, 
to the validity of the anwndinents of union ntl<'s. Plott 
L'. Amalgamated Assn. of Street a11d f,'l('(:frical 
Employees of America, 30 rtah 472, 167 Pac. s:m (J!llil, 
Louisville and N. Ry. Co. r. Jlf i.fler, 219 Ind. :38D, \.t 
2d 239 (1941), cert denied, 317 (i44 (19±1 ), H11r111irut 
i:. UAvV, 12 N.J. Super. 79 A.2cl SS (l!l5l), alldJiurt111 
11• Favcll, 344 Mich. 215, 73 K.\Y. 2cl S3(i (1!J55) all in-
volved appeals from imposition of union disC"iplirn•. 
The law recognizes a distinction lwt\\'e<'ll a uninn 
member's rights clt•rivecl solPly from his union HH·111l11·r-
ship and his rights arising hy operation law. Although Je-
fenclants contend that tltl' plaintiffs in this eas<> ''allt·ge 
that they have a contractual right to l'<'C'('i \'<' strike· benP 
fits pursuant to th<:> constitution of thP union," plaintiff-
actnally alh--'g!::' that their right to n•eein· strikl' lw1lt'!1t-
is derived from the constitution and/or rnadr 
to them b:· a nnion organizl•r. lnsofar as a <·011trac1 
l'Xists - hy means of the constit11tion or oth<>nriH· -
that contract may he intPrprded by thP <'ourts. 
2. The Trial Court Could Not Be Precluded by 
Any Provision in the BLF&E Constitution from 
Taking Jurisdiction over this Action and Grant-
ing the Recovery Sought by Plaintiffs. 
This action doPs not llll'n•l.'· involv<' till' intern:r 1 
affairs of a union. It is, of cotirHP, an adion l'or lirvni:, 
of contract involving a sPrious clPprivation h.'· df'fl'lldant 
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t piamtiff:-:' pec·uniary rights. It 1:-; well e::;tablished 
I t ., ,_t.,te l'Ourt lllay and :should intl,l'Vl'lle in union t j(l .... « . • 
involving property of peeuniary rights of mem-
In this n•spect, it n·1wat<·dly ha:s lwen held that 
tlw dt'privation of p<•euniar:-• lwm•fib resulting from 
, rndiiw ('ontrndual oldigation:-; involvPs a <1nestion of 
IJ ti 
due proe<·:->:-> of law for \Yhieh judieial aid may properly 
iil' • \lll .• Ju r. :2d :2S and the ca::; es cited there-
in. ,\Lor" parti('t1larl>·· a:-; in tlH· in::;tant ease, the 
(·ontrowr:-;:· <'OJl('l'l'llS 11101w:· arnl pro1wrty rights, as 
di:-ting11i:-:lwd from 111atters of a:ssoeiation dis<'iplim·, 
JIO!iey or doetrirn', th<· llll'llllwrs' right to rPsort to tlu..• 
court cannot lw ahridgPd h: JJ!'O\·isions of thP organ1za-
tinn':-: <·on:-;titlltion. U'/Jrie11 I'. Jlatwtl, 1-l 111. App. :2<l, 
li3 1-t-t X.E. :2d -1--1-fi ( 19:->I ) . 
. \. dedaration in tlw eonstitution of an unineorpo-
ratPd a:-;:-:o('iation, lik<· that of .Art. 10, Sec. :3( e) of the 
B.LP.l\:K ('011stitution, (Exhibit J>-1), that its obliga-
to it:-: 1twrnlwrs an· not <·ontradual but moral only, 
and that thl·: do not eonstitutl· obligations Pnforeeahle 
'11 (':':ii adion, <·a11110t l'han1r(• th<• r<·al eharacter of such 
' 
11i1ligatio11.-;. Hof1i11s1111 '" 'i'1·111jJlar f,od!Jc', 1.0.0.F., 117 
('al. ::/ti, -!!I Pa<'. 110 ( 1 
Pro\ i:-:ioJ1:-; of a llnion eonstitution rnust be strictly 
so as to pn•spn·p tl1P rights of mernlwrs to 
d111· ]1!<1<1·:-:s of la\\. i11 tit<' <'ourts. In Armstro11g I'. Duffy, 
( ( Jliio 1 !1:-J I\. thP eourt was eonfronh'd 
11 ith ll11ion rnnstitutional prnvisio11s sirnilar to thosP 
inY 11 k1·d li:· dPfl·rnlants in th<' instant east>. Rejecting 
1111 · 11111011':-; att<·111pt to usp its constitntional in·ovisions 
'11 di·pi;n, tit(• rnllrt of jllrisdidion, th<· eourt in Ann-
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iitrong held such prov1810ns cannot be t'nforced \\liti· 
they impinge upon a union member's right to due proce,,, 
of law under federal or state constitutions. After citill• 
" the Fourteenth Amendment of the United State1:; Con8ti 
tution and a provision of the Ohio Constitution identical 
to that of Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution 11f 
Utah, the court held that the plaintiffs had the right, 
·unrestricted by any constitutional provision ·of the imwn, 
to resort to the courts in the first instance for relief, 
Two further deci8iom; to the effect that a court ma1 
disregard union constitutional provisions that ronflil't 
"·ith duties imposed upon the union by law, inelude R91111 
v. I.B.E.W., 361 F.2d 942 cert. denied, 383 
(1967) (7th C ir. 1906), and Bates r. Brotherlwnd or 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 56 22il 
(D.C. Fla. 1964). In Ryan, thP court held that a nnion 
eonstitutional provision, as construed by the union, was 
inconsistent with the provision of tlw LMRDA, 29 
411 and was t lrns of no force and effr·ct. In so hold 
ing, the court stated: 
This claim of t'1P Union, it s<:>c•ms to ns, 0 
m<'mher's bringing of a snit against a union 01 it' 
offieers too ehancv a o·amhle for the lllP!lliJPI . 
and eff f•etnall \' blocks access to the courts ll\ 
placing thf' rne.rnber in tlw dilemma of 
the ahout which lw ,,·ishes to sw· (<1J1 11 
against which the court might grant i1111rn·diRt• 
and m•cessar,\· rPlief), Or sning U]JOn tJw l'jW<'lli<l 
tion that lw will hf' safe from ('xpnlsion by !Iii 
court's discretion ht>ing <'x<•reisf'd in his favor. 
CongrPss eannot ha \'P infrndPd to bnrd1•11 
the profrction it gav<' union nwrnlwrs in tlw1r 
right to sne in the 'Bill of Rights' of tlw 
with the haz;ard that is clt•ar in defrndants' rlnn: 
42 
TJw right of fr<•e access to our courts is too 
prP.eions a to bP by the predic-
tion that the .Judge's discretion may, like a lucky 
r(lll of <licP, turn up in fa\'Or of the suitor. 
Tht' Boll's ease \ms an action against the BLF&E, 
tlw Jefendant in th<· instant ca:--e. In Bates, tlw court held 
that w'ither tJie union's constitntio11al provision involved 
nor a <lPcision of th<· International President interpreting 
tlw sanit' \ms hiding upon the court. Those matters, be-
in,\r in conflict with provisions of federal labor law, were 
Jwld to be of no legal effect. 
:.:. Provisions in the BLF&E Constitution that 
would Foreclose Plaintiffs from a Remedy Out-
side of the Union are Without Force Under 
Utah Law. 
Ev"n asidt• frorn thP :--nbstantial problems of due 
JH'OCt•ss g"<'nPrntP<l Ji:· tlw exculpatory provision of the 
DLF&E Constitution, plaintiffs, under rtah law, may not 
111• 11ouml to adjudieat<, their rights :--olely within the 
llnion stnwtun'. Altliongh <l<'f Pmlant:-- contend that 
plaintiffs' a\'qtti1·s(·PnC<' to sneh union constitutional pro-
ohligah•s tlH·rn to so confine thPir dispute, snch an 
agTPPll1Pnt i:-- withont forcP in rtah. A contract of this 
natim._ is iclt>ntical to an agn•enwnt to arbitrate future 
a typ<> of agTePnH·nt consistently held illegal 
m state as eontrary to the state constitution and 
lo ll\lhlic polit·y. Barnhart r. Ciril Scrrice Employres 
lu.', Cn., Hi U.2d 223, 398 P.2d (1965). The arbitration 
agn='Pll1Pnt ehallengPd in the Barnhart case was some-
'<1 liat !Ps:-; sm>t•ping than the contractual obligation which 
,], f1·11dants would have the court impose upon plaintiffs 
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m the case at bar. A unanimous Utah Supreme Conn 
found that such a clause violated the terms of Utah Corir 
Ann. 78-31-1 and ·was contrary to the governing case la\, 
of the state. The court went further, holding that sutJ
1 
a clause. was contrary to Article I, Section 11 of the l1taii 
Constitution which provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every iwrson for ,
111 
injury done to him in his person, proprety 01 
reputation shall have remedy by due course of la\r. 
. . . and no person shall be barred from prosr 
cnting or def ending before any tribunal in tlti, 
state, by himself or counsel, any civil trr 
which he is a party. 
The majority held: 
It is thus to be seen that covenants which prm1r 
a party from having access to court nms counter 
to both the expressed purpose and the spirit 111 
our system of justice. This is further aecenteJ 
because snch a ]>rovision purports to confer fina! 
judicial authority on private arbitrators anti 
tends to divest the official courts of jurisdictiu11 
This preclndes them from fulfilling their responti 
bility of remaining available to adjudicate all: 
controversies to seeking justice .... 
The instant case provides a circumstance of just th1 
sort of danger the Utah Supreme Court perceived in 
arbitration proceeding immune to judicial review. Tl 11 
plaintiffs' grievance in this case could not have bei·r, 
satisfied except at a considerable financial cost to tl1 1 
international union. Y t•t the defrndants hPre woulO lia'' 
the court believe that the only review permitted by the 11 
constitution was review by a union officer with an ollit 
ons interest in protecting the organization's funds. 
44 
POINT IV 
APPELLEES WERE NOT REQUIRED TO UTI-
LIZE lNTERNAL UNION REMEDIES TO ANY 
GREATER EXTENT THAN THEY HAD AL-
READY DONE PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THIS 
ACTION. 
:Z9 F.8.C. 411(4) states: 
No labor organization shall limit the right of any 
nwmh<='r thereof to institute an action in any 
court. ... Provided, that any such member may 
he required to exhaust reasonable hearing pro-
cedures (but not to e.rcerd n foitr-month lapse of 
ti111r) ·witl1in such organization before instituting 
lt>gal or administrative proceedings against such 
organizations .... (Emphasis added.) 
ri111e only ''internal remedy" which defendants claim 
plaintiffs failed to "exhaust" was appeal to the general 
conrention of the BLF&E. Hmyever, appeal to the union 
gPneral conn'ntion could not have been taken for almost 
a rear after th(-' dispute arose. (p. 3, supra, R. 785) There-
l'on•, plaintiffs were excused by 8ection 411 from pur-
ming- snl'.h a remedy. Further, plaintiffs already have 
1·xLmrnt<-'d the Brotherhood's internal appellate remedies. 
Artide Section 9(a) of the Brotherhood constitu-
tion statt>s: 
::\ o mt>mher of or subordinate lodge of the Brother-
J1ood shall resort to the civi.l courts to correct or 
rP<lrt>ss any allPged grievance or wrong, or to se-
1·un• any alleged right from or against any mem-
h<'r, s11hordinatP lodge or the organization, until 
sneh lllPrntwr or lodge shall first have exhausted 
all n•rn<>dy h.'' appeal. . 
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Article 16, Section 1, states: 
(b) Should any doubt arise as to th(• rn·o
111
.1 
construction of any section or rule there>of, it sliad 
be ref erred to the International President, wh0,1, 
decision shall be final, unless modified or rever801\ 
by the ensuing convention. 
( c) All interpretations rendered by the Inter. 
national President on the Articles in the constit 11 
tion, shall, unless rejected by the following connn 
tion, be incorporated into the constitution when 
codified. 
Article 13, Section 6 ( c) designates the Internationi.i 
President's decision on questions of union lmv ( distinti 
from other questions) as "final." 
It should further be noted that the sections of tl11 
constitution prescribing the activities and procedures of 
the international convention (Art. I, Sections 10-401 
make no provision for presentation of appeals from presi 
dential decisions. There is no indication that plaintiff.-
would be entitled to appear in person or through coumi! 
before the convention or any committee thereof. The onh 
period during which the com·ention could consider plai11 
tiffs' case would be during the time allocated to resolir 
tions and motions. Yet Art. I, Sec. 29 of the constitution 
restricts the period for such consideration to the first da: 
of proceedings and "one (1) hour at each succeedinz 
morning session thereafter." An extremely abhreviatl'li 
debate before a convention of several hundred union rne111 
hers does not amount to a genuine vehicle for appellat1 
review. 
Finally, the convention is a legislative, not judicial, 
body. Article 1, Section 15 (a) of the constitution stater 
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The Grand Lodge, in convention assembled, shall 
have exclusive jurisdictional and supreme law-
making power over all provisions of the constitu-
tion and matters that concern the Brotherhood .... 
words strongly suggest that the convention is a 
Jpg·isJative body in which plaintiffs would have recourse 
only to political rather than judicial or appellate remedies. 
Defendants have further contended that plaintiffs 
must plead exhaustion of remedies in their complaint. 
However, none of the cases cited by them contain such 
a proposition. Dalton v. Plitmbers and Steam Fitters, 
Local No. 60, 122 So. 2d 88, 89 (La. 1960) states merely 
tJiat plaintiffs must make such an allegation. There is 
no question that such an allegation was made in the 
eonr:o;e of this action. None of the other casE"s cited by ap-
pellants contain even that rule. Indeed, the federal courts 
gen<'rally have treated the exhaustion of remedies doc-
trine as an affirmative defense: E.g., Fruit & Vegetable 
I'ackers and Warehousemen, Local 760 v Morley, 378 
F'.2rl 738 (9th Cir. 1967). 
POINT V 
DEFENDANTS HA VE WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO 
LIMIT STRIKE BENEFITS BY REASON OF 
EARNINGS OF THE PLAINTIFFS FROM OUT-
SIDE SOURCES, AND DEFENDANTS ARE ES-
TOPPED FROM ASSERTING SUCH A LIMIT-
ATION. 
Defendants contend that, under Article 10, Section 
:\(i) of the B.L.F. & E. Constitution, strike benefits to 
:Jii, plaintiffs should be limited to thosei months in which 
47 
thl• striking plaintiffs Parnt>d less than $1 :>0.00 frl) 111 'ii: 
sidt> SOlUCt>S. rl'his elaimed sl't-off has nPv<·r ht>Pn a11 ·1 .. 1 :-..'] 
in this ca:'W. Tlw dPft>ndants wholl>· fail<>d to p!t·ad at, 
such set-off and failed to n•sPrve sarnP as an 1,, 
ht> tri<:>d, and, upon trial, offrn·d no PvidPlH'<· \\'hat11.11 
to support this contention. 
Plaintiffs plPaded, triPd and arglwd this easl• to tli• 
trial court on tlw t lwory that thP <:on tract lwtWl'l'n pia111 
tiffs and defrndants is eYidPnced by th<> oral and wm 
teen offers for membPrship in d<>frndants 111adt· h:i iJ, 
fondants during tlw organiz.ing dfort and acePpt1·1l I· 
plaintiffs Upon joining defendants r['Jip n•c•ord is !Jarn1 
of any evidence that such oral and written off Pr8 in 
eluded any limitation upon the earnings of plaintiit· 
in connection with the "h'lrnrantP<>s'' of strih lH'nPfit·. 
IndPed, the overwh<>lming Pvidt•nc<• is to tlw <'nntran. 
r['ht•J'e is l'Vidence that SOlll<' Of t}ll' plaintiffs\\'(']'(' UU\'ifP1! 
and assun·d by reprt•s<>ntatives of dPfrndants, 
.Mr. L. L. Iman, who \Vas in charge of the c-arnpaign, nn1. 
)ilr. Brehany, the International \'icP-PresidPnt, that tl1 1 
l·nion had ne\·er invokPd tlw $1i50.00 limitation on »ar:: 
ings and would not do so. (H. S/8-SSO) Plaintiff Fn'1 
( )n('ida tPstifit>d that the possibility of dt>frndant/ u 
voking tlw Parings limitation was an issw· rai:-:Pd 11 
thP organiz.ing cont<>st tlw l'nit<'d 
and eamwd dPf Pndants' offic•<•rs to obtain from a 
nnmher a long-timP memlwrs of dl·f<·rnlants af'l'ida11:· 
rf',citinp; that such lllPlllh<-'rs had 1•anwd in 11: 
$150.00 during prior strikes, but that strik<• benefits had 




•1•111iirng toob to in<lrn·1· plaintiffs to join ch•fon<lants, 
\K 
Tlw dPft>ndants m their hrid, at pag1· -H, 
tlw 1.0 11rt to a portion of Article 10, 3(i) 
111 1Jw H.L.F. & 1..:. Co11stitution, and eit<'<l that portion 
1111t 11 1' ('ontext. 1{1->a<l in its L•ntirl'ty, that <·onstitutional 
n·quin·d that dd'Pndants pay to their striking 
;iwllllwrs bendits for a iwrio<l of at lt>ast thirty 
(:lll) da.n;, and tliat thPrPaft1->r "all officers and rnPmbers 
,1f tli1· organization'' t>xt1•1Hl possible assistance to 
1in1l for 111e111lwrs on strikP ." (Exhibit P-1, 
pp. I !J/-1 !I'-\) 
It is, of eours1•, 1mcontrov1->rted that plaintiffs \\·Pre 
J111t paid st rik1· lw11Pfit for thP first (:)0) 
of t!iP strik1· or l'or <rn)· oth1•r part of the strik<•. Tlwre is 
no 1·\ id1·n<·1· that tl11·rpaftt•r officers or 
llli"llll1l'l's of d<'fi.ndants pnl\·idPd assistance to plain-
in obtaining 1·111plo)·11wnt. Thus, <lPfendants wholly 
:':1il1·d to 1wrforn1 tlw 1·onditions pr<'<·edt•nt to their right 
t11 im 11kt- th $1.-iO.Oll 011bid1· l•arninµ:s li111itation as set 
fnrtli 111 tlH· B.L. l•'. & E. ( 'onstitution. 
it' dl'!'P1Hlants had pf>rfornwd tl10se rondtions 
11n•(·1·dP11t, so as to lw PntitlPd to the supposPd lwndits 
tlit>l'Poi". and PVl'n it' then· \\'PI'P l'YidPnrP to support dt>-
li·ndants' ('lailll of sl't-off, dPfrndants lun-P waivPd and 
ari• 1·,;topp1·d m1d<·r tlH· eire1m1stanrPs to assert snrh a 
'ia1m. Tl1P PYidPll<'l' is 111H·ontrovPrted that defendants 
11 "1dl' no attPrnpt <luring thP subjt>et KPmwcott strikP to 
1"1 1·n11i1H· \\']11'1 hPr an)' of its mPmlwrs (old or new, plain-
tiffs or not) had any monthly earnings in exces' 
'IJ[ 
$150.00 per month during the time strjke benefits .h 
paid or payable. (R. 878, 898, 929, and 934-935) DefrnrJ 
ants admittedly did not disqualify a single member fro 
111 
strike benefits during the 1967-68 nation-wide coppei 
strike by reason of outside earnings during the cour8e 01 
the strike. 
That no striking B.L.F. & E. members at Kennecott 
were disqualified by reason of outside earnings is estati 
lished plainly by the testimony of Martin Jensen, 01 
fendan ts' Financial Secretary ( R. 934-935), and inter 
rogatory answers of the defendants on this matter (R 
158 and 215). There is also evidence in the record tha! 
various persons who received strike benefits from d1 
fendants earned in excess of $150.00 per month durinu 
the periods when they received such benefits. (R. SS111 
Defendants instructed their general organizers, who ir 
turn advised plaintiffs, to disregard any constitutiona1 
provision regarding outside earnings during a strikr 
because that provision had never been invoked and woulrl 
not be invoked as a limitation upon the right of plain 
tjff s to receive strike benefits. (R. 878-880, 1002-1004 
E. F. Brehany; International Yice-President, was hirn 
self present on one occasion during the organizational 
campaign when one of the plaintiffs expressly inform111 
those assembled that he had another job which woul1i 
provide him earnings exceeding $150.00 per month dur 
ing any strike, and was nevertheless assured by the d' 
fendant Local's president that he would be eligible for 
full strike benefits. (R. 1006) Brehany took no excfi 
tion to that assurance. 
The trial court, having heard the evidence regarding 
tJw defen<lanh;' a::;surances to plaintiffs that the claimed 
$ICJ0.00 per month outside earning limitation had never 
hrrn invoked and would not be invoked against plain-
tiffs, (•oncludt>d as a matter of law that the defendants 
\\'ere e::;topped by such conduct from now invoking such 
a limitation. ( R. 567 -568) r:ehe court further concluded 
that by reason of that same conduct and the evidence 
that other persons earning in excess of $150.00 per month 
during the strike were paid full strike benefits, the de-
fendants had effectively waived and abandoned their 
1 ight to invoke the claimed constitutional limitation. ( R. 
:Jiii-5G8) ln an effort to counter these conclusions, de-
frndants argue that, since many of the plaintiffs pos-
a copy of the B.L.F. & E. Constitution, no ma-
tl'rial facts were concealed from them, i.e., they could 
have ascertained from reading the Constitution that out-
:-i1<le earnings may disqualify them from strike benefits. 
Un the contrary, the evidence is clear that the defendants 
to plaintiffs that, despite the lan-
i;-nage of tlw constitutional provision on outside earn-
thP same had not in the past and would not now 
hr invoked against the plaintiffs. (R. 787-880, 1002-1004) 
Even assuming that plaintiffs knew of the claimed 
onstitutional limitation, the critical thing unknown to 
tlwrn \1·as that, not withstanding these B.L.F. & E assur-
:rncP" that the limitation had not and v,·ould not be in-
rnked, the Union would disregard such assurances and 
attrmpt to invoke such a limitation against them. The 
]ilaintiffs did not and could not reasonably have fore-
the defendants' flagrant breach of promise on that 
'uh,j1>rt. 
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Defendants have correctly interpreted tlw Jo<'tn
1
,, 
of waiver as involving the voluntary rPlirn1ui1>h1HPnt ,, 
a known right. However, tht>ir argunwnt 11 ,, 
clear record here that such voluntary rPlinquishment dii1 
take place. Defendants certainl.\T knew of the elaiineil 
''right" to limit strike benefits based upon oubidt- f'arn. 
ings, sinep the same is contained in their own Constitu 
tion. Furtht>rmore, the record is clear that dPf Pndantc 
knew (1) that B.L.F. & E. me>mbers had earned in f'Xlb, 
of $150.00 per month during prior strikes and had even 
signed affidavits of that effect, (2) that B.L.F. & E. 
n•presentatives were assuring plaintiffs that no ('()mt 
tutional limitation would be invoked against thflli , 
they joined and thereafter during the period of a strlk1 
earned in excess of $150.00 per month, and ( 3) that nUlu 
erous members receiving strike benefits in the 19Gi-li1 
Kennecott strike had earnings exceeding $1f)0.00 Jh·I 
month. (F.xhibit P-1, R. 158, 215, 878-880, 898, 929, 9:iJ 
935, and 1002-1004) 
Defendants, knowing of such matters and lrnrin, 
taken no action to invoke the constitutional limitation in 
the past or to counter the prPsent that i· 
would not be invoked in the future, cl('arl)T waived a11· 
rPlinquished any right they might have had to up 11' 
that constitutional provision. 
It is highly significant in this case that the rl1·!'Pnd 
ants having learned long before the .Jul)' 15, 19G7 !'il1'' 
mencement of the Kennecott strike that plaintiff:; Ira• 
hePn promised strike benefits regardless of their .i 11: 




,"ardlc•ss of 01eir earnings during the strike period, 
'th J tiwe after acquiring that information and prior 
:I ]I{ 
to thi' strike, informed plaintiffs that they would not 
111 , digihle for strike benefits. 
Plaintiffs were induced by dPfendants to ;join the 
H.L.F. K and thPreby gave up their rights to strike 
fJl'nefits from their previous unions; plaintiffs were then 
n·quirrd to pay dues to the B.L.F. & E. and to perform 
pieket duty and other duties on its behalf. Having im-
posed these burdens upon plaintiffs, defendants then 
ih·nied them strike benPfits at a time of extereme hard-
Because of that hardship, which resulted from 
rH1mdants' failure to pay the promised strike benefits, 
a large number of plaintiffs were compelled to seek out-
vmployrnent and earnings. To allow dt'fendants to 
no\r invoke any eonstitutional limitation grounded upon 
those outside Parnings would 1wrmit defendants to profit 
Imm thPir O\rn inexcusable misconduct and breach of 
pronnse. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT, IN ALLOWING COUN-
SEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS TO CIRCULAR-
IZE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS TO JOIN THE 
CLASS, DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
r nder R ulP 23, U tali Rules Civil Procedure (and 
1
111 • former Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), 
tiJp of the manner in which notice of a spurious 
adion ma)' be circularized is left to the sound dis-
'Tf'finn of the trial court. 
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The right of plaintiffs to circularize notice of a sr 
• iu1 
ious class action has been upheld in numerous e&h 
E.g., Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. i:. Nisli'y, :]Ii 
F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied sub nont., ll'wi 
L Union Carbide and Carbon Co., 371 F.2<l 801 
r ark v. Guaranty Trust Co., 1-13 F.2d 503, 529 (2nd Cu. 
19-14) (dictum); Hormel 1.:. United States, 17 F.R.D.:lii:. 
304-305 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
Neither of the cases cited by defendants prolio· 
authority for reversal of a decision to permit circulariza. 
tion prior to trial. Judge "\Vyzanski, in Chenier t'. Tra; 
sitron Electronics Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. 
1962), specifically recognized that a trial eourt e1:. 
powered to authorize circulation, but decided not !1111, 
so in that case. Id. at 935. 
In Escott 1.:. BarChris Construction Co., 28:3 F'. Su1i: 
fi43 ( S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court declined to authori;. 
circulation after jud.r;ment had bee11 1'1dered - a situ: 
tion very different than that in th<> instant ca::;ti. lnc 
dentally, ther<> is no support in the Escott f, 
defendants' contention that allowing "such solicitati111, 
was not within the discretion of the trial judg-t>'' an1 
that to allow such notice would have been prejudicix 
error. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN THE 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES USED TO COM-
PUTE THE JUDGMENT. 
1. Defendants' Argument is Irrelevant Because 
Plaintiffs Relied upon Representations made 
by the BLF&E and the Terms of that Organi-
zation's Constitution as well as any "Apparent 
Authority of Union Representatives." 
Defendants' Point YII assumes that plaintiff relied 
:inly upon dt:'fendants' representatives' apparent author-
it.1 in entering into their contract with defendants. This 
is not correct (Set> pp. -1-:2-!, supra). Inasmuch as dt>-
fendants' Pstoppel argument is based upon the asswnp-
tion that plaintiffs' reliance was upon union organizers' 
apparent authority only, the point is not well taken. 
2. Estoppel Being a Substitute for Consideration, 
the Measure of Damages to a Plaintiff who has 
Relied upon Defendants' Representations to his 
Detriment as the Value of ·his Contract. 
b;::-:top1wl is a substitute for eonsideration. Eaton v. 
ll'11cuf_l.-t l'tah :2cl 395 P.2d 332 (1956); II WILLIS-
TOX, COXTRACTS 553A; RES'rATKMENT, CON-
TRACTS, 90 (1932). Therefore, the measure of 
duP a plaintiff establishing estoppel is the value 
11f hi" l'ontract. CONTRACTS, 90, 
F1 u111ples. TlH'l'P is no in plaintiffs' cited 
or elsewhere that a plaintiff's damages are lim-
;i,"d to thosp proximately caused hy his reliance. 
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3. Plaintiffs Relied Upon Defendants' Representa. 
tions, at Least to the Extent of Paying Dues 
and Performing Strike Duty. 
The trial court stated the ahov<· as a fin<linc• o!' 1. /:'"" d1 
(p. 2fl, supra). Tlw aets plaintiff perforn1<'d ai 11111111 
to adequate rt> liane<> to invokP tlH' dod ri rn · o l' 
CON'l1RAC'L1 S 90, E.1·r1111zJ!cs; Fi; 
cral Fi11r111ce Co. r. ll11111isto11, +O-t. P.:2d -t.G5 nYa"I. 
19fi5); Zir 1'clrTisio11 r. Proqrn111s, !11c. /'. 
Grocers of South CaroliJ1a, 11-t. S.E. 2d 78:3 (S.C. 
POINT VIII. 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH OVER THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THIS ACTION IS NOT PRE-
EMPTED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS ACT. 
The statement ap1wari11g- at pag<· :->S of' <lPfrmla11t, 
IH"i<'f that ""one of tlw fidd represPntatives of the Brother 
hood arrogatPd to himsdf <'ontrol of th1· <'a111paig·11" · 
contrary to the evid<'ne<' and ineonsist<'nt with the pro]Jh 
findings of the trial court that find an1pl<· 1-'ll]ipol't" 
th<' reeord. (See Point I, See. +above). TIH' PvidPn1·· 
is that L. L. Iman, hrothPr-in-law of 11. K (;illwr1 
Pn•sidt'nt of <lefrndant B.L.F. & E., eon<ln<'h•d till· "at 
paign under the scrupulous iwn;onal su1H·n·il"io11 11!' \l 1 
( ;j]bert, and that l\lr. Oil be rt was at all fomili:! 1 
with and in personal ehargl' of th<· earnpaig11. ( H. 11! 11 
!)3, 119fi and Exhihits P-85 to P-135). Tlw claim enr 
tained later in tlw same varagraph of dPfrn<lant'' hrii/ 
that thf' repn•sentation of paynwnt of strikP lwnrfit· 
regardless of election result was mad" "latPr 111 t!i 
1.11 ,1.ti" 11 cawpaign" i:-; e(fually inconsi:-;tent with the evi-
di·JJf'f' an<l \\ i th thP trial court's findings. ( Point I, 
,'-'.e(-. (j n!JOn'.) ThP evidt>n('e is that this n•1Jl'esentation 
l!IH<l1· !'10111 tht- im·<·ptio11 of th1· l'arnpaign and pro-
yideil a material part of tit(' offer of rnPrnrwrship made 
II\ tlw defrndants to <·a('lt of tlw plaintiffs. (R G71, lOGO-
lll anu P-1, l l, :.21, -!1, 31, 1:2 and 1-!0). 
l)dendants' pn·P111ption argmrn,nt is a "n'd herring." 
!Jefrndants argtw that heeause tlwy ean cite no cause 
'.iltich 111 tlwir Yi<'\\" involves the grant of rPlief similar 
tr' th<· reli1·f granted in this ease, therefore, it must fol-
in11 that su('h n•lit>f is not perrnissiblf::'. But surely the 
c·onrt:'l'SP of tlw statt•rnt-nt is far more correct. Defend-
anb have not citt-d and eonnot ('ite a single ca:-;e holding 
or that eontrartual promisPs 11iadP in tlH· <·on-
tPxt of a union-organizing effort cannot lw PnforcPd 
lwntu:<<' of s<mll' supposed conflict with national labor 
p1li1·:-. D111 w.;· t:w trial plaintiffs' eounsd challenged 
1ldtnrlants' f'oum;el to present such a case, and none 
1ras fortlwoming. 
jJJ of th<' eases decided the Vnited States Su-
pn·n11· ( 'omt and low1•r frdPral <'Onrts in which the so-
l'allPd ··prernPption" doetrine has been artirulatrd have 
111volnd violations or dairned violations of Sertion S 
11 1' ih" ;\ at1onal Labor Relations Act. None have in-
rnlnd conduct in the contPxt of organizing campaigns, 
wlur·h <lo<"s not fall within thP purview of Section S, hut 
11 l1i('lt falls within tlw urview of Section 9 of that Act. 
if dd\•ll(lants' prePrnption argument were wrll 
1"tlllilPd, <1Pf Pndants eould eite at least onP rase in whieh 
the argument has no much as been raised before , f1ar 
ticularly in light of what defendants charartf'rize tli 
"great number of representation disputes" that hait 
occurred since the amendment of the National Labui 
Relations Act. 
The record m this case establishes that plaintif;·, 
in an effort to determine whether or not defendant" 
preemption argument had any merit, sought an officia 
determination by filing a charge with the National Lahi,, 
Relations Board. This is precisely what defendants elaii: 
plaintiffs should have done, and this is precisely wha1 
plaintiffs did. By letter dated April 2, 1968, tlw 
tional Director for Region 27 of the National Labor 
Relations Board refused to issue a com11laint on tl11 
facts alleged in this action (a copy of plaintiffs' Colli 
plaint herein having been appended to the chargP a, 
filed), stating: 
The above captioned case charging a violatior 
under Section S of the Na ti on al Lahor Relatinr1' 
Act, as amendPd, has been carefully investigatr< 
and considered. 
As a result of the investigation, it has lwen e1111 
eluded that in the absence of any evidenct' tb 
the unions' withdrawal of strike bt-nt>fits affret1 1 
tlw employment status or job opportunitirs 11 : 
collectivf> bargaining contract benefits of ell; 
ployees, its conduct was not considered to rni11 
within the ambit of St-ction 8(h)(l)(A). [m1. 
therefore, refusing to issue complaint in thii' 111:, 
ter. 
This determination, absent an appeal to tlw genrr: 
counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, "111 ,: 
c·1J <iPfendants did not undertake, constitutes a final 8 ]J]J ( 
·inrl binding d!:'termination by the National Labor Rela-
;ions Board that the matters complained of in plaintiffs' 
L'ouiplaint an· not within the purview of the Board's 
(ttlministratiYe Jl°'''ers or the National Labor Relations 
Act. 
That determination by the National Labor Relations 
Doard is clearly correct. Although the National Labor 
Relations Board has authority under the National Labor 
Helations Act to conduct elections to determine the de-
of employees with respect to their collective bar-
gaining representatives, there is nothing in that act or 
tlir decision then•under which in any manner supports 
the def assertion that such election powers pre-
dude state courts from enforcing contractual obligations 
of unions or r!:'medying their tortious conduct. On the 
contrary, in the leading case of International 
hon of Jluchi11ists c. Gu11zales, 356 U.S. 617, 620, 78 S. 
Ct. S2:i, 9:25 (19fiN), tl1e lTnitPd States Supreme Court 
upheld the rights of union members to sue 
theii' union in a state court for breach of contract. In 
doi11g, tlw Court stated: 
... The protection of wnion members in 
their ri_qhts as nwmbrrs from arbitrary conduct 
ln1 1111ions and 1wio11 officers has not been under-
taken by federal lau', and indeed the a.ssertion of 
(Illy such pou·er has uren expressly denied ... 
'rhus, to pr<'clude a state court from exerting its 
traditional jurisdiction to determine and enforce 
the rights of union membPrship ·would in many 
ra::;e8 IPavP an unjustly ousted member without 
r0mP<l>· for the restoration of his important union 
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rights. Such a clrm;tic result, on the n·inoti 
sibility of some entanglement with th(' !> 1'':' 
Jl1J1'1I 
enforcement of the national polie:I' would 1"1 • 
11 . . d" . f jlL, a more eompe mg m icat10n o eongTessiona! 1 1 
than can be found in the interstiet•s of thl' 
Hartley Act. ( 1£mphasis added) ' · 
rrhe United States Supn•uw Court has eitl•d th(, Go 1i: 11 /, 
('ase with approval in a number of recent cases, 
Nation((l Labor Relations Board v. Allis-Chalmers J//,1 
Co., 388 lT. S. 182, 87 S. Ct. 2001 (1967). In tlw Al/, 
Chalmers case it was held that nothing in the f PdPn: 
labor acts prevented a union from attempting to enfor1., 
in the state courts fines imposed upon ifa mPrnhH, 
pursuant to the union's constitution. for crossing sud 
union's picket lines during a strike. Certainly. if ti' 
defendant unions can utilize the state courts to enfor1, 
the provisions of their ocnstitution against tlwir rn1 11n 
bern, plaintiffs, who are union members, should liki 
wise be allowed access to the state courts to enforce thP11 
rights against those unions. 
The Gonzales doctrine, ·which sustains stafr corn· 
jurisdiction over such "internal union matters," \\i' 
also followed in Vaca, et al.. v. Sipes, 38G F S. lSO, ;; 
S. Ct. 903 ( 1967). In the Vaca case, the Supreme Com: 
held that the Missouri state eourt had jurisdiction 11! 
a damage action brought against a union by a discharge11 
employee who alleged that lw had heen discltarµ:Pd i1' 
violation of the collective bargaining contract, and tha' 
his union had arbitrarily and without just eause refni1' 
to take his grievance to arbitration under the contra11 
The Court rejected the union's contPntion that tlw 
court lacked jurisdiction because the gravanwn nf ti1' 
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· ,1-as argmahly and basically an unfair labor prac-*·t1nn · • 
·. .1·tJ·11·n the exclm;ive jurisdiction of the National fii·t' II 
1 
,alior Relations Board. 
rn rejecting a similar contention that a state court 
adion for damages arisin gfrom libelous conduct occur-
rint: dnring a union organization campaign was barred 
subject to the Taft-Hartley Act, the Supreme 
Court held: 
''Vlhile the Board might find that an employer 
or union violated Section 8 by deliberately mak-
ing false statements or that the issuance of mali-
cious statements during the organizing campaign 
had surh a profound pffect on the election as to 
require that it hr set aside, it looks only to the 
eo1•rcive or misleading nature of the statements 
rather than tllPir defamatory quality. Thf' injury 
that th(• 8tatt>Itwnt might cause to an individual's 
reputation - ·whether lH.' be an employPr or union 
official - has no rf'levance to the Board's func-
tion. Li1111 1'. Plant Guards Local 114, 383 U.S. 60, 
G3, SG 8. Ct. G57, ( 19GG). 
rr'lw Court \\-ent on to say: 
"'Th<• Board C'an m\·ard no damages, impose no 
JH;nalt.\·. or give any otllPr relif'f to the defamed 
in<liYidnal." Li11n r. Plant Guards, supra. 
in tlw instant case, the Na ti on al Labor Re-
lations Board could grant no reliPf to plaintiffs. Thus, 
it was in·opt-rl)- ·within the province of the lowPr Court 
to try this case and grant to plaintiffs the relief to which 
tlJP>' were entitled. 
This Court should not seriously Pntertain the arti-
ir.,. and fnhrieated prPemption argument urged by de-
61 
fendants. 'rlw facts of this <:asp an· simple and iiwii[\, 
no national labor policy implications. iii· 
• ' Oii: 
ised that if plaintiffs joined defendants, tlwy ,,.0 1, • U 11 
receive certain benefits. Plaintiffs joined defenrlant 
and paid substantial dues and otherwise supported df 
fendants. Defendants broke faith with plaintiffs by fail 
ing to fulfill the plan and indeed admitted promises mad, 
to plaintiffs. (See Stipulation, R. 1060-61) Tlw tria; 
court had no difficulty with this argument, recognizinz 
easily a legal argument, fabricated out of wholP clot\,. 
irrelevant to the issues of the case, and made in dPsJiera 
tion in the face of an indefensible factual situation. 
POINT IX 
SECTION 501 OF THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 
OF 1959 IS NO DEFENSE TO THIS ACTION. 
Defendants' Point IX, like Point VIII, is a desperat• 
legal argument fabriiated because no factual defense i: 
or can be made. It is more than sufficient amnrrr ti· 
the convoluh·d reasoning of defondants' brief, JH'Pdieat11l 
upon out-of-context quotations of thc> statute, to refe1 
this Court to two other "clear and unequivocal'' 
of the same Act npon which defendants claim they rely. 
Section 411(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reportini 
and Disclosure Act of 1959 provides as follows: 
"No labor organization shall limit the right 11! 
any member therPof to institute an action in an\ 
court or in a proceeding before any administra 
tive agency, irrespective of whetlwr or not thr 
labor organization or its officers are named i' 
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11te defendants or rt>spornlf·nh; m such action or 
d . " procee mgs. 
The sa111e Act. in s('Ction 523 (a) provide::; as follows : 
"Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, 
nothing in this aC't ::;hall rPduce or limit the re-
sponsi hi liti<>s of any labor organization or any 
officer, ag<>nt, shop ::;te\\rnrd, or other representa-
tiw of a labor organiaztion, or of any trust in 
whieh a labor organization is interested, under 
anY otlwr frderal law or under the laws of anv 
and, except as explicitly provided to 
contrary, 1wthing in this act shall take away any 
riqht or bar any remedy to which members of a. 
/a/J{Jr organization are entitled under such fed-
crnl lair or laze of any state." (Emphasis added) 
Deefndants' argument totally disregards these clear 
]ll"OYisions of the statutes. 
Evt>n if tht> statute werf> not in itself inconsistent 
1rith dl'f'l'ndants' <'<>ntentions, those contf>ntions are irrel-
L·rant. They d<>1wnd Pntirely upon the notion, which is 
1rhully without ::mpport in this reeord or in law, that 
t11P of strikP benefits to plaintiffs as admittedly 
pnnn1sed hy defendants would violate defendants' Con-
In :support of that argument, defendants cite 
,\rtirlP 10, Seetion 3, paragraph (a) of that Constitution 
(DPf. Brid', pagP 72) and argnP that plaintiffs did 
nut t>ngagp in a legal strikt> authoriz(•d by def Pndants. 
Tit(· Court should consider that claim. It is, of course, 
not elaimed that plaintiffs did not participate in a strike. 
Tl1Py did. lndPed, thP record not only shows that they 
JiarticipatPd, hnt <>stablishes that they fulfilled assigned 
Pif'kpt for fl pf endants and otherwise satisfied each 
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and every obliagtion of union memben;hip in conJ'un •l, ' c li1]1 
with that strike. (R. lOGl and Exhibits P-8, 11, Hi, lk ·Ji 
rrhere is no claim that the strike was illPgal. 
the last to claim that this strib_, was ill<·gal would 1,' 
those who initiated it, namely, the defendant unions anrl 
other unions at Kennecott. Nor can it be serious!; 
claimed that the strike was not authorized by defendant; 
(See Point I, 8Pc. 7 abon' for full discussion) The fat· 
that defondants paid strik<> benefits to some of their 
members engaging in this same strike, as the reriirrl 
clearly establishes, should he to Pstahli,lt 111 
yond doubt that no claim is or can be made that defend 
ants did not authorize the strike. ( R. 917-939 and fa 
hibits P 179 to 84) 
Accordingly, and contrary to the spurious argumen: 
made in defendants' Point IX, plaintiffs as mt•rnlwri '· 
deefndants did engage in a legal strike authorizP<l 11: 
defendants, and like all of defendants' other nwrnlwr· 
who engaged in said strike, are Pntitled to the :-tnK· 
benefits provided to them under defendants' constitutir" 
and promised to them but unjustly withhPld frolll 
Clearly, the facts of this case require the conelusion t]w· 
the vPry provisions of the Labor-Management Reportini 
and Disclosure Act of 1959 upon which J'P 11 
have been violated by defendants in tht>ir wrongful M 
arbitrary refusal to pay to plaintiffs the arlmitteill1 
promised strike benefits. There neither is nor ean Ir 
nnv merit whatever to the false contention that dPffnil 
ants' payment of these benefits would violafr that Y 
G4 
CONCLUSION 
'l1lw judgment below should be affirmed in all re-
,;rwcb sinl'e tlw findings of fact upon which it is based 
are owrwhel111ingly supported by the evidence of record. 
Furthrr, the trial court was correct in its finding that 
a valiJ. contract existed for the payment of strike bene-
fits to those plaintiffs who joined the defendant unions 
nnd perfornwd the duties required of members. 
The trial court correctly decided that it had juris-
tliction to adjudicate this action to enforce the contract 
rights of nnion members. Appellants' defense of ultra 
clrcs, "special status" of trade unions, non-exhaustion of 
renlPdies, wajver, incorrect measure of damages, etc. 
gPnerally assume factual data not supported by the 
C"ourt's findings of fact and are grounded upon an incor-
tTd interpn·tation of the relevant law. 
It is difficult to imagine an action which the funda-
nwntal ekments of justice and equity are more decisively 
1111 the side of one party than they are here. The grava-
111t·11 of tl1e q1wstion before the court simply is this: Is 
'l labor union situated as is the defendant Brotherhood 
frf't' to haw its officers and/or representatives misrepre-
·'L'llt and dPeeiw· with impunity in recruiting and dealing 
11ith inemhers, or may union members seek redress for 
1i 11 lMi01rn of their contractual rights in courts of general 
,juri1'did10n on the same terms as any other citizen 1 
l':i state the question is to answer it. 
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For the foregoing rea::;ons, plaintiffs resp('Ctful), 
submit that the judgment entered by the trial roun ii, 
affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGL:BW, 
CORN\V ALL & l\J cCAR'l'l1\ 
C. Keith Rooker 
Richard W. Giauque 
Ricardo B. Ferrari 
Attorn<>ys for Pla.intifts-
Respondents 
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